Testing cooperative game theory through a contextualized pole-playing game about irrigation water management by Désolé, Mathieu
                                                
F a c u l t é  d e  S c i e n c e s  É c o n o m i q u e s  
 
 
Testing Cooperative Game Theory  
through a Contextualized  
Role-Playing Game  
about Irrigation Water Management 
 
Construction and test of the experimental protocol 
 
Mémoire de recherche présenté par Mathieu Désolé 
 
 
Pour l'obtention du : 
Master Recherche 2 
Économie et Gestion du Développement Agricole, 
Agro-alimentaire et Rural 
 
 
Structure d’accueil : CEEPA – University of Pretoria (South Africa) 
Avec le concours financier du Projet SafeWater ARISE 
 
 
Sous la direction de : Dr Stefano Farolfi, Maître de stage, Chercheur-enseignant 
CIRAD UMR G-EAU 
 
Co-direction : Prof. Sophie Thoyer, Montpellier SupAgro 
                                 Dr Patrick Rio, Chercheur INRA, UMR LAMETA 
 
 
 
 
 
SEPTEMBRE 2007 
 
Mathieu Désolé | Master Recherche EGDAAR | Montpellier SupAgro | 2007 
 
 
 
2 
Index 
Index ..............................................................................................................................2 
Acknowledgements........................................................................................................3 
List of abbreviations......................................................................................................4 
Note for the reader ........................................................................................................5 
Introduction...................................................................................................................6 
Chapter 1: Literature review ...................................................................................8 
1.1. Experimental Economics and Companion Modelling ........................................ 8 
1.2. Cooperative Game Theory and Experimental Economics ............................... 10 
1.2.1. What is Experimental Economics (EE) ?........................................................................10 
1.2.2. Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) and EE......................................................................14 
1.3. Methodology of EE............................................................................................... 18 
1.3.1. The protocol and the instructions....................................................................................18 
1.3.2. The main methodological issues of EE...........................................................................20 
Chapter 2: The CGT Model...................................................................................31 
2.1. The CGT Model* (V2)......................................................................................... 31 
2.2. Calibration of the model and expected results .................................................. 34 
Chapter 3: The contextualized experimental protocol building ..........................38 
3.1. The Experiment.................................................................................................... 38 
3.2. First Test Session - 12th of June 2007.................................................................. 39 
3.2.1. The two versions of the game .........................................................................................41 
3.2.2. Results ............................................................................................................................42 
3.2.3. Lessons ...........................................................................................................................44 
3.3. Second Test Session - 18th of July 2007 .............................................................. 46 
3.3.1. Differences between the two test sessions ......................................................................46 
3.3.2. Results ............................................................................................................................49 
3.3.3. Lessons and perspectives ................................................................................................54 
Chapter 4: Conclusion and research perspectives ...............................................56 
4.1. The decontextualized experiment ....................................................................... 57 
4.2. The players ........................................................................................................... 57 
References ...................................................................................................................59 
Annexes .......................................................................................................................63 
Annex A.............................................................................................................................. 64 
The version V1 of the CGT Model................................................................................................64 
Annex B.............................................................................................................................. 66 
First test session - 12th of June 2007 .............................................................................................66 
Annex C.............................................................................................................................. 84 
Second test session - 18th of July 2007..........................................................................................84 
List of tables ..............................................................................................................102 
List of figures and pictures .......................................................................................103 
Table of contents .......................................................................................................104 
 
Mathieu Désolé | Master Recherche EGDAAR | Montpellier SupAgro | 2007 
 
 
 
3 
Acknowledgements 
First of all I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr Stefano Farolfi 
(CIRAD/G-EAU and CEEPA), for his follow-up and total support, for providing me 
valuable advices, spending time in all aspects of this research work and correcting my 
“French/English” with lot of patience. Stefano, you were more than a supervisor 
during these 4 months. Sincerely, thank you very much. 
 
Thank you to Prof. Sophie Thoyer (Montpellier SupAgro, France) and Dr Patrick Rio 
(INRA Montpellier, France), for having accepted to be my co-director for this Master. 
 
I also wish to acknowledge and thank all the researchers involved along with the three 
persons above mentioned in the module 3 of the SafeWater ARISE project, Prof. 
Fioravante Patrone (Univ. of Genova, Italy), Dr. Ariel Dinar (World Bank, 
Washington), Prof. Rashid Hassan (CEEPA/UP, Pretoria), Mr. Beyers Havenga 
(DWAF, South Africa), Dr. Juliette Rouchier (CNRS/GREQAM Marseille, France), 
Dr. Wisdom Akpalu (CEEPA/UP, Pretoria), for all the valuable advices and remarks 
provided during my work. Particularly, I want to pass my sincere gratitude to Prof. 
Patrone for his crucial contribution in building-up in collaboration with Dr Farolfi the 
CGT model used as the theoretical reference for the experimental protocol. 
 
I also thank Prof. Johann Kirsten, Director of the Department of Agricultural 
Economics at the University of Pretoria, and Prof. Rashid Hassan, Director of the 
Centre for Environmental Economics and Policy in Africa (CEEPA) for their support 
and welcome during the 4 months of my stay in South Africa. Particularly, I would 
like to thank CEEPA for giving me the great opportunity to attend two lectures on 
Game Theory provided by Prof. Partha Dasgupta (the 10th and 11th of June 2007). It 
was really for me a unique experience. 
 
I would like to thank CIRAD for hosting me as a young research trainee and the 
SafeWater ARISE project for its financial support that made possible this work. 
 
I finally wish to thank all the participants of the two test sessions, the 6 students and 
the 3 researchers of the Department of Agricultural Economics, PG Strauss, F. Meyer 
and T. Funke, for spending time on playing our game. The lessons from these two 
sessions were precious to improve our experimental protocol. 
 
Last but not least, my sincere thanks to my parents, my friends and to Myriam for 
their kind support in spite of the distance. 
 
Mathieu Désolé | Master Recherche EGDAAR | Montpellier SupAgro | 2007 
 
 
 
4 
List of abbreviations 
 
ARISE 
 
CE 
CEEPA 
CGT 
CIRAD 
 
 
ComMod 
CPR 
DE 
DWAF 
EE 
GIS 
INRA 
 
IP 
Kat AWARE 
 
MAS 
PD 
RPG 
SAFeWater 
 
TK 
UP 
VCM 
WUA 
ZAR 
Action Research on Institution, Social aspects and Economics of water 
management 
Contextualized Experiment 
Centre for Environmental Economics and Policy in Africa 
Cooperative Game Theory 
Centre de coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour 
le Développement 
French Agricultural Research Centre for International Development 
Companion Modelling 
Common-Pool Resource 
Decontextualized Experiment 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
Experimental Economics 
Geographic Information Systems 
Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique 
French National Institute for Agricultural Research 
Performance Index 
Role Playing Game and Model developed in the Kat River Basin 
(Eastern Cape, South Africa) 
Multi-Agent Systems 
Prisoners’ Dilemma 
Role-Playing Game 
South African – French Network for Research in Water Science and 
Technology 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) 
University of Pretoria 
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism 
Water Users Association 
South-African Rand 
 
Mathieu Désolé | Master Recherche EGDAAR | Montpellier SupAgro | 2007 
 
 
 
5 
Note for the reader 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The objective of this Master was to realize, during 4 months of stage at the University 
of Pretoria, a literature review on Cooperative Game Theory and Experimental 
Economics, to build-up an experimental protocol and to test it by conducting two 
game sessions. No additional time was allowed to produce the present document, 
which was therefore written at the same time of the research activities. For this 
reason, some parts of this document are not developed and refined as much as the 
author and his supervisors would have wished. These parts will be deepened in future 
works already scheduled within this research program. Moreover, due to the fact that 
the author of this Master is not English mother tongue, despite the efforts and helps a 
number of language errors and imprecise expressions are certainly still present in the 
document. The author apologizes for this. 
 
Mathieu Désolé 
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Introduction 
This thesis is based on the work of construction and test of an experimental protocol 
adopting a simplified Role-Playing Game (RPG) to test hypotheses issued from 
Cooperative Game Theory (CGT). The RPG context refers to the case of common 
property water allocation among farmers and derives from observations made during 
a participatory project on water governance in the Kat River Basin (Eastern Cape, 
South Africa). 
 
During this experience based on an approach called Companion Modelling 
(ComMod), a Role Playing Game called KatAWARE was developed to reproduce the 
functioning of a real catchment – the Kat River - and allows local stakeholders 
(members of a WUA) to play around water management in order to : 
- understand the complexity of the system; 
- understand the relations between agents; 
- understand the impact of different water allocation strategies on the water 
flows, the profits, employment and domestic users’ satisfaction; 
- build up a catchment strategy within a Water Users Association (WUA). 
Local stakeholders played two sessions of the KatAWARE RPG (Farolfi and 
Rowntree, 2007). Once the ComMod process was ended, the RPG outcomes (first 
session) were compared with theoretical results from a Cooperative Game Theory 
(CGT) model calibrated on the same data (Dinar et al, 2006). Several similarities 
resulted from this comparison, even if the complexity and the dynamic nature of the 
RPG determined differences in absolute terms. In particular, the distribution of the 
payoffs among the three sub-basins that resulted from the CGT model was similar to 
the one observed as an outcome of the RPG session. 
 
The encouraging, though still vague, results of this first comparison between RPG and 
CGT outcomes suggested to deepen the analysis in the direction of an experimental 
use of the RPG in order to test a certain number of hypotheses made by the CGT. 
Particularly, a) individual rationality of agents in a cooperative situation is tested: 
through the RPG, we observe if players behave rationally according to the CGT 
predictions (profit maximization through the optimal use of water). b) We can also 
test players’ attitude about the allocation of common resources in a coalition in order 
to get the highest possible payoff (concept of side payments). c) We finally verify 
whether the distribution of RPG payoffs obtained playing cooperatively (through 
grand coalition) correspond to the CGT outcomes calculated through the Shapley 
value. 
 
To do so, the Kat RPG was simplified and “polished” of all elements needed when 
used in the context of stakeholders’ negotiation support, but not directly related to the 
CGT hypotheses being tested. Nevertheless, a certain degree of contextualization was 
maintained (farmers producing cabbage that compete for irrigation water, stock of 
water available in a dam, etc.). The adoption of this RPG for experiments to test CGT 
hypotheses triggers an important research question: can we use a Role Playing Game 
derived from a negotiation process as a contextualized laboratory experiment to 
test hypotheses? This question is particularly relevant in the field of Experimental 
Economics, where experiments are usually conducted in a very de-contextualized way 
(Eber et Willinger, 2005) in order to avoid different understanding of the context by 
the players, due to their culture, education, experience, personality, which influence 
their own perception of the context. 
Mathieu Désolé | Master Recherche EGDAAR | Montpellier SupAgro | 2007 
 
 
 
7 
 
To provide insights on the issue of game contextualization, some CGT hypotheses 
previously mentioned can be tested also through a de-contextualized version of the 
game. The results obtained through the contextualized game, the de-contextualized 
one and the theoretical model based on Economics assumptions of agents’ rationality 
can be compared in order to answer the main research question. 
 
After having played the games with “candid players” represented by university 
students, a further step of the research consists in playing with “real” stakeholders 
involved in water management (farmers, water managers, decision makers). This step 
aims at isolating the “experience” complexity component (the personal representation 
of a context, built up through the own history and education and the experience 
acquired in the field) that influences players’ behaviour.  
 
During the 4 months of stage at University of Pretoria, this Master has focused on the 
preparatory work of this research, consisting in 1) produce a literature review on CGT 
and Experimental Economics (EE) in the field of water management; 2) the 
degradation of the original RPG into a simplified game to be used in a laboratory; 3) 
the design and test of an experimental protocol to be followed during the 
implementation of the experimental phase. These three steps were realised in close 
collaboration and under the supervision of the CEEPA/CIRAD team involved in the 
axis 3 of the SafeWater ARISE project. At the same time, the theoretical CGT model 
that backs the experiment was developed by Dr. Stefano Farolfi (CEEPA/CIRAD) 
and Prof. Fioravante Patrone (Un. of Genova – Italy). This Master did not contribute 
directly to the development of the model, which is included in the thesis for reasons of 
clarity and to provide complete information about the research. 
 
This document describes the above-mentioned research steps covered so far: The 
literature review (Chapter 1) provides some references in the field of Experimental 
Economics (EE) and Cooperative Game Theory (CGT), with particular attention to 
the applications to water management. Chapter 2 presents the CGT model used to 
compare the experimental results with theoretical Economic assumptions; Chapter 3 
describes the simplified RPG and the proposed protocol for experiments. Particularly, 
the two test sessions conducted at University of Pretoria are thoroughly detailed and 
the consequent evolution of the game and of the protocol is provided; Chapter 4 
concludes and provides the way forward of this research activity. 
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Chapter 1: Literature review 
This chapter presents a literature review on the use of Experimental Economics (EE) 
to test Economic hypotheses with particular emphasis on Cooperative Game Theory 
to study Economic agents’ behaviour in water management. This review is divided in 
three axes. Each axis leads to the elaboration of the research question developed in the 
present work: can we use a Role Playing Game derived from a negotiation process as 
a contextualized laboratory experiment to test Economic Theory hypotheses? 
 
The first axis recalls the Companion Modelling experience developed around the 
water management issues in the Kat River Basin, South Africa. The second axis is a 
survey on earlier publications on Experimental Economics and Cooperative Game 
Theory, focusing more precisely in experiments around the management of a 
Common-Pool Resource such as water. The third axis is a review of the main 
methodological issues of Experimental Economics, focusing more specifically on the 
technical aspects faced during the development of our protocol. 
1.1. Experimental Economics and Companion 
Modelling 
As it will be presented below, one of the principles of an experiment is to give a study 
the possibility to be reproduced afterwards. Rouchier (2006) discusses two different 
approaches that gather empirical data and link them to models and simulations: 
Experimental Economics, and Companion Modelling, which “accompanies observed 
social groups when they negotiate over renewable resource issues”. 
 
Companion Modelling (ComMod) (ComMod Group, 2003) is a participatory and a 
negotiation support approach that takes place in the field. The ‘field’, unlike the 
‘laboratory’ used in EE, is an environment, which has not been constructed or 
manipulated by an experimenter who therefore cannot control it. The field is also a 
complex system. The two objectives of ComMod are firstly to understand complex 
environments, and secondly to support collective decision in complex situations. 
These objectives correspond to a global objective of increasing the knowledge either 
for the scientist or the field stakeholders through a permanent and iterative 
confrontation between field circumstances and modelling processes. 
 
The common approach developed in ComMod is based on cycles or “loops” of 
communications between the stakeholders and the scientists. Many tools as Multi-
Agent Systems (MAS), Role-Playing Games, or Geographic Information Systems 
(GIS) are used as a way to share viewpoints and to support the dialogue between both 
parts. In some ComMod experiences, like the one in the Kat River, the researcher 
starts building a first preliminary model to explicit the theoretical “pre-conceptions” 
(Farolfi and Rowntree, 2007). The confrontation of this first model with the 
stakeholders allows revising and re-building it, taking into account the field situation 
and the stakeholders’ questions and remarks. This dynamic process leads to the 
construction either of a new model derived from the previous one or a totally new 
one. Stakeholders learn collectively by creating, modifying and observing simulations 
(ComMod Group, 2003). 
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The local stakeholders are part of the framing process in the ComMod approach. As a 
consequence, experiments developed with ComMod are unique. Therefore, it is 
impossible to reproduce the same experiment with others players in order to gather 
data and compare it. Rouchier (2006) stresses that the first and most obvious limit of 
ComMod is “the lack of accumulation of a knowledge that could be generalized to 
more than one situation”. Reproducibility of the experience is the strength of 
Experimental Economics, which establish a methodology with standards to describe 
the settings and the results of an experiment. The author suggests that an intermediate 
approach could be chosen between Com Mod and EE. 
 
In a ComMod approach, which involves many disciplines in the analysis (e.g. 
Sociology, Psychology, or Economics) many phenomena could be observed and some 
could be seen as ‘exhibits’, consisting in empirical regularities that are discovered and 
for which, at the time, there are no well-developed theoretical explanations (Sugden, 
2005b). This particular use of a game or an experiment to ‘exhibit’ phenomena will be 
presented later in the text. ComMod experiments could give rise to new research 
questions derived from the results, but different from the original research framework. 
One could see the exhibit function of ComMod and the consequent move to 
laboratory to run experiments and test hypothesis as a further “loop” or cycle within 
the ComMod process. This loop moves away from the stakeholders originality 
involved in the process and becomes a research-oriented phase of ComMod, where 
the negotiation component (stakeholders’ participation) is completely absent. The new 
loop becomes also mono-disciplinary (Economics in our case) and refers to a specific 
problem of the Economic Science. This replication of a same contextualized 
experiment in many different fields will provide a capitalization of data. 
 
An example of emergence of a new research question during a ComMod approach 
took place in the Kat River project (Farolfi and Rowntree, 2007). This ComMod 
experience included a Role-Playing Game (RPG) played by local stakeholders 
(members of a Water Users Association, WUA) in order to understand the complexity 
of the system, the relation between agents around water management, and also the 
impact of the strategies of water allocation in the field in order to build up a common 
strategy for the WUA. The two RPG sessions played during the ComMod experience 
allowed observing cooperation among the different players in the use of the water 
available from the Kat dam, situated upstream the catchment. This observation 
suggested an attempt of comparison between the results obtained through one of the 
two RPG sessions and a Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) model calibrated on the 
same data (Dinar et al., 2006).  
 
The comparison showed some similarities about players’ behaviours and the 
distribution of profits (payoffs). It was an encouraging result with regard to the 
attempt to compare outcomes obtained through both empirical and theoretical 
approaches. However, these two approaches show many differences, that cannot 
allow concluding definitely about the robustness of such similarities in the outcomes. 
Therefore, replications are needed to verify the strength of the results. Consequently 
the idea emerged to construct a “polished”, though still contextualized game derived 
from the RPG used in the Kat to replicate experiments in order to test cooperative 
behaviour of agents around water allocation. 
 
As it will be discussed in the next section, most experimental economists have a 
common agreement about the use of “decontextualized” experiments, consisting in 
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experiments developed in an environment as neutral as possible. This environment is 
created in a laboratory, where the experimenter controls all the parameters of the 
experiment. According to the experimental economists, only such experiment, 
composed by neutral instructions which allow the control by the experimenter of the 
likely players’ interpretations of the environment, allow the comparison of its 
outcomes with ones obtained through the model based on the assumption which is 
tested. 
 
Instead, in the ComMod approach, stakeholders are involved in the design of the 
Role-Playing Game; consequently the game is as much “contextualized” as possible. 
By using a game derived from a ComMod experience to run experiments in a 
laboratory, the question is to verify if such contextualized game can be useful to test 
theoretical assumptions. 
 
In conclusion of this part, the present research could be seen as a bridge between 
ComMod and Experimental Economics, because a contextualized RPG derived from 
a ComMod RPG is used to test theoretical assumptions through laboratory 
experiments. The choice of an EE approach is motivated by the possibility to 
reproduce many times the experiment, with the clear willingness to gather data and 
capitalize knowledge. 
1.2. Cooperative Game Theory and Experimental 
Economics 
The second axis of the literature review, developed in this section, looks at the 
epistemological basis and the main characteristics of Experimental Economics (EE), 
whereas methodological problems of EE will be discussed in the next axis. As 
Cooperative Game Theories (CGT) hypotheses will be tested in this research project, 
a short overview of CGT literature, particularly applied to the field of water 
management is also provided. 
1.2.1. What is Experimental Economics (EE) ? 
1.2.1.1. Epistemological basis 
For a long time, Economics was perceived as a descriptive Science more than an 
experimental one. Sugden (2005) reminded what Milton Friedman (1953) said: 
“Unfortunately, we can seldom test particular predictions in the Social Sciences by 
experiments explicitly designed to eliminate what are judged to be the most important 
disturbing influences.” 
Although experimental methods have a long history in Economics, it is only in the 
last twenty-five years that they have gained real acceptance in the discipline, as 
demonstrated by the Nobel Prize in Economics awarded in 2002 to Daniel Kahneman 
and Vernon Smith (Eber et Willinger, 2005). 
 
EE involves players in a game and specifically studies their behaviour when facing a 
particular situation. Consequently, EE is not exclusively concerned by Economic 
issues and also takes into account results derived from Psychology in order to study 
agents’ behaviour. In situations where the Economic Theory does not work at all, 
economists need to accept their limitations and look to disciplines like Psychology for 
the answers (Binmore, 1999). EE crosses the boundaries of both disciplines and takes 
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part of what Simon (1959) named more generally the “Behavioural Science”, which 
gather Economics and Psychology. Simon (1959) proposed that the psychological 
model of an adaptive man could complete the model of the neoclassical “homo 
oeconomicus”. However, Rubinstein (2006) criticized the use of Psychology on 
Economics by highlighting the limits of psychological experiments and argued that 
these limits are lowering Economics standards instead of opening the range of 
Economic researches. 
 
Every Economic theoretical field potentially has an EE application. Cardenas and 
Carpenter (2005) listed the different theoretical themes in Economics which have 
been studied through the use of experiments (cf. table 1). 
 
Theme Application 
Preferences and norms 
 Social preferences (altruism, trust, reciprocity, fairness, 
cooperation) 
 Risk and time preferences 
 Intra-household allocation and bargaining 
 Gender, ethnic, racial discrimination 
Social dilemmas 
 Public Goods provision and Voluntary Contributions 
Mechanisms 
 Common-Pool Resources 
 Prisoner’s dilemma, Trust, Third party punishment 
Games 
 Self-governing institutions 
 Non-subgame perfect solutions (e.g. communication, 
punishment) 
Well-being 
 Behavioural effect of poverty and inequality 
 Norms and poverty 
 Behavioural effects on Environment or Health outcomes 
Asymmetric information in incomplete 
contracts 
 Land, labour and credit markets 
 Gift-exchange in labour and land contracts 
 Share-cropping and other land arrangements 
Biases, heuristics & decision making 
 Loss aversion and endowment effects 
 Hyperbolic and other non-linear discounting 
 Risk & Stakes 
 Expectations 
Institutions behaviour and feedback 
 Institutional determinants of behaviour (e.g. crowding in 
and out, intrinsic and extrinsic motivations) 
 Behavioural determinants of institutions (e.g. property 
rights-formal vs. informal, individual vs. collective) 
 External regulations, self-governance and imperfect 
monitoring 
Table 1. Economic themes and experimental application  
1.2.1.2. The objectives of experiments in EE: 
1.2.1.2.1. Experiment as a test of the Theory 
Rubinstein (2001), one of the contemporary theorists, stated that Economic Theory is 
an abstract investigation of the concepts involved in real life decision making, rather 
than a tool for predicting or describing real behaviour. Consequently, Economic 
theorists’ goal is to clarify the connections between different types of concepts and 
patterns of reasoning. They attempt to draw links and understand rather than predict. 
 
To illustrate Economic experimentalists’ practice, Rubinstein (2001) used the 
example of the Nash’s Theory. Many experimentalists naively interpreted Nash’s 
Theory to be predictive. Researchers tried to test whether the outcome of the Nash 
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bargaining solutions is indeed obtained. Rubinstein said that “it would be a miracle if 
the Nash formula could provide a prediction of the complex activity we call 
bargaining”. The fact that Nash axioms analytically deduce the solutions does not 
mean that human beings behave accordingly to them. It is more the interpretation, 
rather than the predictions of the solution which should be the subject of the 
experimentation.  
 
A way for the interpretation of the Theory is the use of a model (Hausman, 2005). A 
good model is realistic if it describes a situation as it is perceived by decision makers 
rather than a presentation of the physical world. Models are not meant to be 
isomorphic with respect to reality but rather it must be similar to the way in which the 
world is perceived by the human beings. In Economic Theory, the interpretation of a 
model is essential because assumptions which are plausible with a certain 
interpretation may be absurd with another (Rubinstein, 2006). Once Economic Theory 
is interpreted in a model, assumptions derived from this Theory can be tested in an EE 
experiment. Experimentalists run experiments not to see whether Economic Theory 
work or not, but to classify Economic environments into those where the Theory 
works and those where it does not (Binmore, 1999). 
1.2.1.2.2. Experiment as an exhibit of new phenomena 
Some EE researches have discovered empirical regularities for which there were no 
well-developed theoretical explanations. Such experimentally-observed regularities 
(“exhibits” or “phenomena”) have served as benchmarks for subsequent theoretical 
work. Increasingly, theories are being constructed with the intention of explaining, or 
at least accommodating experimental observation (Sugden, 2005a and 2005b). 
 
An example of a new Theory arisen from observation of empirical regularities is 
provided by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). They run some experiments in which the 
same problem of decision-making under risk was described in different ways. The 
major Theory of decision-making under risk is the expected utility model. According 
to this Theory, the utility of a risky project is equal to the expected utility of its 
outcomes. The expected utility is obtained by weighting the utility of each possible 
outcome by its probability. When faced with a choice, a normatively rational 
decision-maker will prefer the alternative that offers the highest expected utility, 
whatever the way the problem is presented. 
 
However, the results obtained illustrated that people ‘exhibit’ patterns of preference 
which appear incompatible with Expected Utility Theory. Consequently, Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) proposed a new model, called “Prospect Theory” which modifies 
Expected Utility Theory in order to accommodate their experimental observations1. 
1.2.1.2.3. Experiment as a decision support. 
EE allows public decision-makers to test the effectiveness of political systems before 
implementing them or to assess the impact on social welfare of new regulations 
(Tisdell and Harrison, 1992; Cummings et al., 2004). For instance, Willett and Sharda 
(1997) used an experiment for evaluating the effectiveness of two different policies to 
                                                 
 
1
 Let with x and y be prospect outcomes with probability p and q respectively. Values v(.) are 
associated with these outcomes. According to prospect theory, there are decision weights (.) 
associated with the probabilities, such that the overall value of the prospect equals (p)*v(x)+(q)*v(y) 
instead of p*v(x)+q*v(y) from expected utility theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). 
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manage water quality. EE can help also private decision-makers (i.e. entrepreneurs) to 
simulate market strategies and their consequences on firm profit (Eber and Willinger, 
2005). 
1.2.1.2.4. Experiment as an educational tool. 
Involving students with experiments in a classroom could be a tool in order to teach 
Economics concepts and mechanisms (Brañas-Garza, 2006). Boone and Van 
Witteloostuijn (1999) incorporated an experiment in a two-week “skills training 
course” in applied Game Theory for undergraduate students specialized in Business 
Administration or Economics. The purpose of the course was to teach students to 
apply and understand the consequences of formal Game Theory. The experiment was 
a tool to deepen the students’ understanding of behaviour in a game-theoretical 
setting. 
1.2.1.3. The characteristics of EE experiments 
In any Sciences, an experiment has two principles. 1) It consists of setting-up a 
controlled environment in order to reproduce artificially theoretical conditions and 
parameters and 2) it insures that the study can be reproduced afterwards. 
1.2.1.3.1. Parameters control 
Experiments are designed to test theoretical predictions, or more precisely to test the 
assumptions of a model derived from the Theory. Therefore, an experimental 
environment is deliberately configured to be like the Theory (Sugden, 2005a). 
Theories are developed in “abstract” conditions and the simulation of such conditions 
is possible in a laboratory. Just as it is needed to use clean test tubes in chemistry 
experiments, economists know that they cannot test Economic assumptions in 
circumstances in which these assumptions should not reasonably be expected to work 
(Binmore, 1999). 
 
Experiments in a laboratory have advantages because observation of real facts in their 
natural environment (i.e. in the field) does not allow isolating precisely the factors 
influencing them. The experimenter can reproduce artificially theoretical 
environments by trying to control all these factors. 
 
Moreover, some situations are difficult to observe in the field because they seldom 
appear spontaneously in real-life and need particular circumstances to become visible. 
The laboratory provides the conditions to provoke such situations and to observe their 
consequences (Eber and Willinger, 2005). 
1.2.1.3.2. Reproducibility 
Economists can generate their own data from experiments and do not have to rely on 
one another’s data. Series of experiments allow the scientific community to build 
upon and critique one another’s work in ways that are not as readily available to 
economists using non-experimental methods (Roth, 1991). The replication of an 
experiment by the scientific community would prevent erroneous conclusions. 
 
However, replication of experiments is not really rewarded because professional 
rewards are given to original or new experiments (Rubinstein, 2001). In fact, the 
system deters the researchers from running either the replication or the refutation of 
experimental results. 
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1.2.1.4. The limits of experiments in Economics 
1.2.1.4.1. External and Internal Validity 
The first limit presented to criticize the use of experiments in Economics is the lack of 
‘external validity’2 or ‘parallelism’. This issue is not only the characteristic of 
Economics topics, but concerns the whole Social Sciences that adopt empirical 
methods. The question is to know whether players’ behaviour observed in one 
experiment is not just an ‘artefact’ created by the laboratory atmosphere of the 
experiment, and therefore not extendable to any case (Eber and Willinger, 2005). 
 
Experiments, in general, have the reputation of being high in ‘internal validity’, i.e. 
the ability to draw confident causal conclusions from the results of a research 
(Loewenstein, 1999). However, EE experiments also face criticisms about internal 
validity. Specifically, experimental economists are “alleged” to run experiments in 
different places and times with different players without taking into account these 
differences in the interpretation of their results. During the time which separates two 
experiments, an event could occur and probably influence players’ behaviour, 
removing internal validity from the experimental research (Loewenstein, 1999). 
1.2.1.4.2. Contextualization3 
The most controversial issue in the EE is about the experimental context. A common 
agreement among experimenters in the EE research field is to make neutral or 
‘abstract’ as much as possible the context of the experiments. It is argued that the 
experimenter loses control on the experimental parameters since players have 
different interpretations of a given context (Eber and Willinger, 2005). However, the 
argument stating that the players have the same perception of a neutral context is 
controversial, as a too neutral experimental context could induce players to 
misinterpretation of the treated issues due to a lack of a cognitive representation 
(Loewenstein, 1999; Pillutla and Chen, 1999; Harrison and List, 2004). 
1.2.1.4.3. Stationary replication 
Some experiments are composed by several rounds per session, with strictly the same 
game features in each round (Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 1999). The main interest of 
this ‘stationary replication’ used in EE experiments is to study the important question 
of how people learn in highly repetitive situations. The advantage of repetition is that 
it allows the experimenter to estimate whether the experimental outcomes are the 
result of players’ confusion and inexperience. 
1.2.2. Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) and EE 
Experiments explore most research fields in Economics. More particularly, EE 
focuses on three Economic issues: rationality, markets and Game Theory. One of the 
favourite fields in EE is individual rationality. Through experiments, the hypotheses 
of the Theory of individual choices are tested in different ways. Particularly, 
individual choices are studied under certain, uncertain, or risky environment. Another 
field for EE applications is the study of markets. (Eber and Willinger, 2005). 
 
                                                 
 
2
 The external validity refers to the ability to generalize the results obtained from the experiment to the 
real settings that the research intended to approximate (Loewenstein, 1999). 
3
 The context issue will be developed deeply later in the text (cf. part 1.3.2.2.3). 
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Social interactions, which gather both individual choices and market situations, are 
also studied through EE experiments. Game Theory can be used to model the actions 
of individuals in a market situation simulated in a game. Games may be classified as 
cooperative or non-cooperative. This part presents cooperative games and the 
assumptions of Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) that are tested in such games. Some 
issues concerning the use of CGT and EE to treat water management problems are 
finally discussed. 
1.2.2.1. The Cooperation between players in EE games. 
Many experimental studies stressed cooperative behaviour whereas Game Theory 
predicts selfish behaviour. Typical experiments used to assess the cooperation issue, 
such as the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game, the public good game, also named 
voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) game, (Gachter et al., 2004; Rege and 
Telle, 2004), or the common-pool resource (CPR) game (Cardenas, 2003). The 
common characteristic of such games is that they correspond to a social dilemma. A 
social dilemma is a situation in which the individual short-term interest leads to a 
collective long-term disaster (Pillutla and Chen, 1999). Among these games, the PD 
game (cf. table 2) is the most famous and the most used in Experimental Economics. 
The PD game has been used to model cooperative behaviour (as opposed to competitive behaviour). Two 
participants are involved in the most widely used class of PD games. Each player has to choose 
independently between two options: cooperation (C) or defection (D). The payoff of one player depends 
upon the choice made by the other. The general form of the PD game can be represented in a 2*2 matrix: 
 Player 2 
 Choice C D 
C R, R S, T Player 1 D T, S P, P 
The payoff to the left of the comma in each cell is the outcome of player 1, whereas player 2 payoff is 
given to the right of the comma. 
R indicates “reward” for mutual cooperation, T denotes the “temptation” to defect, S refers to “sucker”, 
and P is the “punishment” for mutual defection. The payoff structure presented in the matrix is a PD game 
if and only if the following inequalities are satisfied: T>R>P>S and 2R>T+S>2P (Boone and Van 
Witteloostuijn, 1999; Dasgupta, 2007) 
Table 2. General form of the prisoners’ dilemma game  
The VCM and the CPR games have also a great interest in studying social 
interactions. In both cases, there is the same conflict between individual and collective 
interests. The public good (VCM) and the CPR games can be conducted with several 
players who must choose between many strategies4. VCM and CPR games have a lot 
in common but with a basic difference. The public good game is designed around the 
participation in a common project, whereas the CPR game is framed around the 
extraction from a common pool (Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 1999). 
♦ A public good is a commodity that can be provided only if group members 
contribute something toward its provision whereas all persons (contributors 
and non-contributors) may use it (Pillutla and Chen, 1999). In that case, one 
contributor can consider the others’ contributions as positive externalities on 
the public good (Willinger and Zigelmeyer, 1999). 
♦ A common pool is accessible to all persons of a group, but one member’s 
extraction reduces the potential benefits of the others. Then, one user can 
                                                 
 
4
 The VCM and the CPR games are played with more than the two players involved in the PD game 
and the several players have more than the two symmetric strategies (cooperate or defect) of the PD 
game (Eber and Willinger, 2005) 
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consider the others’ activities as negative externalities on the common pool 
(Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 1999). This kind of other members “exclusion” 
from the resource is an important difference with the classic public good 
definition (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2005; Eber and Willinger, 2005). 
1.2.2.2. Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) 
Game Theory studies strategic behaviour of decision-makers in situations where one 
player’s decisions affect the other players. The basic assumption of Game Theory is 
that decision makers are rational players and take into account other decision-makers’ 
rationality to build expectations on their behaviour (Parrachino et al., 2006a). There 
are two main branches of Game Theory, the first is Non-Cooperative Game Theory 
and the second is Cooperative Game Theory (CGT). This review focuses only on the 
second branch, as the model to be tested experimentally in our research is a CGT 
model. Unlike Non-Cooperative Game Theory, CGT does not focus on the coalition 
building among players but rather studies the possible results of cooperation. More 
particularly, CGT objective is to determine what coalition could be formed among the 
players in a game and how coalition gains are shared among its members. 
Specifically, CGT focuses on the solutions of the grand coalition that includes all the 
players. Cooperative models are generally framed as follows (Parrachino et al., 
2006a): 
 
Let N be a finite set of n players in a transferable utility game5. Let S and T be subsets of 
N. S and T are called partial coalitions and N is the grand coalition composed by all the 
players. 
Let v be a real-valued function defined over all the subsets of N. Commonly, v is the 
payoff obtained, such as the payoff obtained by farmer i as singleton is noted v(i) and the 
payoffs for the coalitions S and N are v(S) and v(N) respectively. 
Supposing that the players agree to work together on a certain objective, the main 
question in cooperative game models is how to allocate the earnings of a coalition 
among its members (Parrachino et al., 2006a and 2006b; Dasgupta, 2007). More 
specifically, the question is how the players divide v(N) between all of them. 
 
A distribution of v(N) among the players is represented by a reward vector x such as the 
part of v(N) received by farmer i is represented by xi. If the players allocate all the 
amount of v(N) among them, the efficiency principle is satisfied, meaning that xi=v(N). 
 
Different solution concepts of the payoff sharing issue are developed in CGT and 
could be provided as a subset or as a one-point (unique) solution. 
 
♦ Subset solutions refer to a range of values that satisfy certain conditions and 
provide various possible solutions. The core is one example of a subset 
solution. A payoff vector x is in the core if it satisfies the following 
conditions (Tisdell and Harrison, 1992; Abbink et al., 2003; Parrachino et al., 
2006a): 
- individual rationality; i.e. for all i  N,   xi  v(i) 
                                                 
 
5
 A “transferable-utility game” is defined as follows: if a coalition can obtain a total utility, this utility 
can be divided among the members of the coalition in any possible way. Particularly, it is possible to 
transfer money among the players in order to reallocate the profit gained through the coalition 
(Parrachino et al., 2006a) 
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- group rationality; i.e. for all i  S, for all S,   xi  v(S) 
- efficiency; i.e.    xi = v(N) 
 
Other subset solutions exist, such as the Kernel or the least core (Parrachino et al., 
2006a). However, the set of vectors that forms such a subset solution is often too large 
to provide any usable information.  
 
♦ A one-point solution is the unique solution that satisfies the conditions 
imposed by the solution definition. The Shapley value is a kind of one-point 
solution. The Shapley value solution vector satisfies individual and group 
rationality. It is defined such as each player’s reward xi equals a weighted 
average of the contributions the player makes to each coalition of which he is 
a member (Parrachino et al., 2006a). The Shapley value represents a “fair” 
payoff sharing, taking into account the players’ strength and weaknesses 
(Tisdell and Harrison, 1992). 
1.2.2.3. Water management issues 
Despite the increasing competition around water resources, the level of negative 
externalities associated with water utilization is a big incentive to cooperate 
(Parrachino et al, 2006b). Cooperation over scarce water resources is possible under a 
variety of conditions. CGT and EE are useful tools to assess water management 
policies and to provide arrangements in water allocation. 
1.2.2.3.1. CGT and water management issues  
Issues of water resources, for example urban water supply, water pollution, or 
irrigation can be modelled with CGT. Particularly, CGT approach is useful in 
irrigation cases. Irrigation models are typical of transferable-utility situations where 
players can transfer resources or the benefits from using the common-pool resource 
(Parrachino et al., 2006b). 
 
Tisdell and Harrison (1992) assessed the impact on social equity of two methods of 
water entitlement allocation. A model based on a real field situation in Australia was 
developed and the two water allocation alternatives were analysed using different 
CGT solutions. Particularly, Tisdell and Harrison (1992) studied the effect on the 
grand coalition payoff of the two different water allocation methods. They provided a 
useful tool for further water policy evaluations based on CGT. 
1.2.2.3.2. EE and water management issues 
Generally, Environmental Economics researches are conducted in the field and 
policies evaluation are developed from field observation. Ostrom (2006) asked “what 
more can you possibly learn about institutions and resource governance from 
laboratory experiments that you have not already learned in the field?”. In field 
researches, environmental economists are never certain that the specific variable of 
their study is isolated. A good way to understand which components of a CPR 
situation affect agents’ behaviour is to study a simplified version of a field experiment 
in the laboratory in order to control all variables (Ostrom, 2006). 
 
Some water management policies are developed by using EE experiments in a 
laboratory. Cummings et al. (2004) present experiments that policymakers used to 
design and implement a policy in their environment. Their objective was to reduce 
water usage for irrigation and they compared total irrigation within different rules of 
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water allocation. However, water management issues are not exclusively around 
quantity, but water quality is also approached through EE experiments. Willett and 
Sharda (1997) conducted in a laboratory an experiment as closely as possible to actual 
circumstances. They tested the impact and the effectiveness of two different policies 
and suggested some advices to improve water quality in the real situation. 
1.3. Methodology of EE 
This section presents the some methodological issues that arise when designing 
Economics experiments. An experiment is described in a protocol, which guides the 
experimenter who runs the game. The protocol must be precise in order to allow 
further replications of the experiment (either by the same experimenter or by other 
researchers). The instructions of a game are the framework that guides the players and 
also must be clear, in order to avoid mistakes in players’ understanding of the game. 
 
Sugden (2005a) stressed that from the beginning, Economics experimenters have been 
criticized for their methodology, and more particularly for the ‘artificiality’ of the 
laboratory experiments, unlike field experiments, which are more concrete. 
Laboratory environments exclude features of the world that are crucial for the 
workings of real Economic institutions. Among the methodological features 
representing critical points, Sugden (2005a) listed the following:  
 
- subjects are unrepresentative of agents whose behaviour Economic Theory is 
designed to explain, and they do not have adequate opportunity to learn by trial and 
error how to act rationally in a way that Economic agents do in the field; 
- incentives to optimise are smaller in the laboratory than outside; 
- the abstract context of experimental tasks removes cues that, in the field, help 
people to orient themselves, and the social norms that guide interaction in the field 
are not adequately reproduced in the laboratory. 
In this section, after a description of the procedures gathered under the term 
“protocol”, these three points will be discussed focusing specifically on a) the 
characteristics of the participants of a game, b) the incentives that motivate them, c) 
the framing effect of the instructions on players’ behaviour, and d) the importance of 
the experimental context. 
1.3.1. The protocol and the instructions 
As a preparatory task to an experiment, the researcher must design the framework of 
the experiment. The protocol is a set of procedures which includes the whole features 
of the experiment. It describes the categories of players who will participate, the 
instructions that the players will get, the incentives, the rules of the game and all the 
information needed in order to prepare the sessions. The experimenter may have 
different kinds of development around a same protocol. Each protocol version with a 
particular parameter is designed to study one kind of assumption. A treatment is a 
particular version of a given protocol, which relies on a specific pattern of parameters 
of a game. For example, in a game studying cooperative behaviour of the players, a 
first treatment could be a protocol version in which players cannot communicate each 
others and a second treatment could be a protocol version of the same game in which 
communication is allowed (Eber and Willinger, 2005) 
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The instructions provide the players all the relevant information needed to understand 
the rules. The instructions could be written either on a paper (more classically) or on a 
computer screen (when the experiment is run in an informatics experimental 
laboratory). At the beginning of the experiment, the participants read the instructions 
individually and then these instructions are read aloud by the experimenter. This stage 
is very important, because the players thus know that these instructions are a common 
knowledge for all the participants (Eber and Willinger, 2005). 
 
The experimenter must be sure that the subjects understood the instructions. Actually, 
a player who does not understand the task could have a biased behaviour and his 
misbehaviour could introduce errors in the game, hampering the experimenters to 
conclude about the robustness of the results. The experimenter has different 
possibilities to insure a perfect understanding of the game by the players. He could 
give some examples of decisions to be made and the consequent results, directly 
written within the instructions in order to assist the subjects’ understanding (Cardenas, 
2003; Rege and Telle, 2004). Each participant could have to answer a short 
questionnaire that tests his understanding of the task. Certain subjects could reveal a 
lack of understanding. Then, they get a special individual tutoring before the 
experiment starts (Pillutla and Chen, 1999; Cooper and Kagel, 2003; Gachter et al., 
2004; Rege and Telle, 2004). Another method is to play a first try before starting the 
game that will not count in the final calculation of the players’ outcomes, in order to 
familiarize the participants with the task (Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 1999; Cardenas, 
2003). In case of games in which the players need to calculate their outcomes, the 
experimenter could give all the subjects a tool to help them in their calculations. 
Cardenas (2003) gave the players a same table of payoffs, function of individual 
choices and the choices of all the other participants in order to assist them in the 
decision-making procedures. He also notified in the instructions that this table of 
payoffs was common knowledge. 
 
A granted rule, shared by all experimental economists, is that the instructions must 
provide information as honest as possible, in order to avoid deception6 due to false 
instructions, as used sometimes in psychological experiment methodology. 
Nevertheless, some information could be hidden, such as the individual results of the 
other players, in case of games in which anonymity is required. Such anonymity is 
provided at the beginning of the game as common knowledge for all the players, thus 
there is no deception. Some other researches run experiments with a surprise re-start 
of the game (Cardenas, 2003; Akpalu, 2006). For example, at the beginning of the 
experiment, players are told to play individually a game in which talking is 
prohibited. Then, new instructions are distributed and communication between the 
players is allowed. The players did not know previously that there would be a re-start 
and discovered it “in live” when the experimenter announced it, but it is not a 
deception case because the experimenters do not manipulate the participants by 
changing the rules without informing them. 
 
At the end of the experiment, the researcher generally gives a debriefing to explicit 
the experiment results and possibly pays the participants (in case of monetary 
                                                 
 
6
 In case of deception, the players believe they are playing some game but actually the experimenter is 
manipulating them. For instance the experimenter could involve a subject in a game in which the other 
players are not real players but either experimenter’s accomplices or computers. The experimenter thus 
creates a false environment to test the subject’s reactions (Eber and Willinger, 2005). 
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rewards, cf. part 1.3.2.2.1). A questionnaire could be distributed at the end of the 
experimental session, during the debriefing. The players answer questions about the 
game (i.e. about certain issues related to the study and the reasons of their choices 
during the game), and personal data on their Socio-Economic characteristics. This 
information could be used further by the experimenter for statistical analysis about the 
influence of players’ characteristics (e.g. male/female; student/non-student) on their 
behaviour (Cardenas, 2003). 
1.3.2. The main methodological issues of EE 
1.3.2.1. Players 
The experimenter, before the game, has to recruit subjects. According to the category 
of subjects he would use to run the game (e.g. students, local stakeholders, etc.), the 
researcher has different methods to contact people. For the games in which the players 
are students, the recruitment could be made by direct communication either through 
announcements in classes (Cooper and Kagel, 2003) or by approaching randomly 
people in the corridors of the university (Gachter et al., 2004). An email posted to 
diffusion lists is another possible way to contact directly people (Kuhberger et al., 
2002). Posters placed on collective places (in the University or in the workplace if the 
players are students or non-students respectively) and flyers distributed during 
meetings are other methods for recruitment (Cooper and Kagel, 2003; Carpenter et al., 
2004). 
 
The more people participate to the experiment, the more robust the results. 
Nevertheless the number of participants depends on constraints that often hamper the 
experimenter to run the game with a large number of players7. Once the volunteers are 
chosen, the experimenter invites them to participate to the experiment and gather 
them in the experimental place. 
1.3.2.1.1. Experiments with students 
In the majority of the experiments, participants are students (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1981; Carpenter and Cardenas, 2004; Brañas Garza, 2006; Akpalu, 2006). They are a 
convenient sample for academics because they are already within an academic 
environment, they could be motivated by a willingness to learn and could be curious 
about participating in the scientific research. In case of using monetary rewards to pay 
the participants, students could be motivated also by lower amount than other 
category of people, which is a relevant practical advantage. Students can be viewed as 
the standard subject pool used by experimenters (Harrison and List, 2004; Eber and 
Willinger, 2005). 
 
The main criticism with respect to the students’ samples is the potential biases 
introduced by the use of participants who are not representatives of the whole society 
(Benjamin and Robbins, 2007). 
 
Some studies compared the results obtained by running experiments with both 
students and non-students samples. Gachter et al. (2004) studied the Socio-Economic 
                                                 
 
7
 For instance, the constraints could be the capacity of the experimental room, the number of available 
computers of the experimental laboratory, or the available budget if the players receive monetary 
rewards at the end of the game. 
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impact on trust and voluntary cooperation. They conducted a VCM experiment (i.e. a 
voluntary contribution mechanism game, cf. part 1.2.2.1) with students and non-
students people in rural and urban Russia. The results showed that non-students are 
more trusting and contributed more to the public good than students. Gachter et al. 
(2004) controlled for the Socio-Economic characteristics of the participants by 
submitting them a questionnaire at the end of the game. By analysing the players’ 
responses, they found that Socio-Economic background matters for trust attitudes. 
According to their findings, the dominant Socio-Economic variable is age: older 
people exhibit more trust than younger people. The age mean, standard deviation and 
range within a students sample are lower than ones within the society. The impact on 
the results of the participants’ age disappears when running experiments only with 
students. Moreover, Gachter et al. (2004) found that with respect to some Socio-
Economic characteristics (e.g. membership in civic associations), the Russian student 
generation seemed to be closer to the American population investigated by Glaeser et 
al. (2002) than to the non-students of their own society. Consequently, it seems to be 
questionable to generalize to the whole society, characterized by particular features 
(e.g. culture, history), the results obtained with students who do not share totally the 
same features. 
 
Some studies focused on such features of the society, comparing for example the 
effect of culture on people’s behaviour. Carpenter and Cardenas (2004) were 
interested in cross-cultural comparisons of players’ behaviour in experiments. Such a 
comparison was made after running the same experiment with people from different 
cultures in different locations. Carpenter and Cardenas (2004) proposed to allow 
participants from different cultures make decisions in the same experiment. Using 
Internet, they were able to run real-time experiments in which half of the participants 
were students from Colombia and the other half were students from US. The students 
played firstly a CPR game (i.e. a common-pool resource game, cf. part 1.2.2.1), 
facing the situation in which subjects extracted resources from a forest that also 
provided non-use (i.e. conservation) benefits. Secondly, the participants played a 
dictator game8 by allowing them to voluntarily and anonymously donate any portion 
of their earnings from the CPR game to two real biodiversity conservation projects, 
one benefiting the local community and the other benefiting the international 
community. 
 
The CPR results showed that American participants reacted by reducing forest 
extraction while the Colombian participants extracted significantly more when placed 
in groups with Americans. At the same time, the donation phase results (i.e. the 
dictator game) seemed to indicate that the Colombian students had a stronger 
preference for favouring the national (local) program and a weaker preference for 
global conservation than the American students. Cultural specificities seemed to 
influence the students’ behaviour. However, these conclusions provided from 
experiments run with students remain questionable, as students are not representative 
of their own society. For example, it is impossible to conclude that Colombian people 
in general would extract more from a resource when faced with American people. 
 
                                                 
 
8
 The dictator game is a variant of the ultimatum game. In the ultimatum game, one player proposes a 
second player a split of a sum of money. If the responder accepts the offer, the offer is implemented; if 
he rejects it, both players receive nothing. In the dictator game, the responder does not have veto power 
over the proposed split and simply receives whatever the proposer gives (Carpenter et al., 2004). 
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Boone and Van Witteloostuijn (1999) compared the impact of culture9 and education 
on the competitive and opportunistic behaviour through a prisoner’s dilemma game 
(cf. part 1.2.2.1) conducted with students. These authors confirmed Carpenter and 
Cardenas’ (2004) results, indicating that cultural background influences players’ 
behaviour. They also found that culture is much more firmly imprinted in an 
individual’s mind than educational knowledge. Then the effect of culture seemed to 
dominate over the impact of education. The impact of education on behaviour was 
studied by Frank et al. (1993) who questioned if “studying Economics inhibits 
cooperation”. Frank et al. (1993) observed that students specialized in Economics 
behaved in more self-interested way than other students. They found that this 
difference seemed to result less from training in Economics than because people who 
chose to study Economics were initially self-interested. In other words, the exposure 
to lectures of self-interested models do not cause more self-interested behaviour, since 
it may be that economists were merely more interested by such models, and this was 
one reason why they chose to study Economics. This result confirmed that education 
is less influential than individuals’ own characteristics (e.g. cultural background or 
academic preferences). 
 
According to the previous examples, culture and age seem to be central in a society 
and seem to influence strongly people’s behaviour. When using students to run 
experiments, researchers work with a sample where the variability of these two 
relevant characteristics is not representative of the whole society. Therefore the 
external validity of such experiments (i.e. the effects found in the laboratory are 
representative of the real world phenomena) remains controversial. 
1.3.2.1.2. Experiments with non-students 
As stated above, experiments are generally run with students samples, also called 
“standard samples” (Harrison and List, 2004), but this kind of experiments showed 
some limits. In order to overcome these limits, the experiments could be run with 
“non-standard” samples (i.e. with non-students). Some researches focused on 
particular non-students samples, such as traders, managers or local stakeholders, in 
order to test the influence of their specific characteristics on behaviour (Eber and 
Willinger, 2005). Other researches run experiments with people in the field (i.e. in 
their own environment) and they do not focus on a particular Socio-Economic sample 
(Cardenas, 2003; Gachter et al., 2004). One particular advantage of running 
experiments in the field is the much wider variation for the skills and levels of 
understanding of the problem by participants, especially considering the different 
levels of schooling, and more particularly the lack of schooling (Cardenas, 2003). 
This lack of academic education is possibly balanced by non-students’ experience. 
 
Cardenas (2003) conducted an experiment in the field and focused particularly on the 
influence of people’s wealth on people’s behaviour. The game was the CPR game in 
which the participants had to manage a forest. The players were local stakeholders 
who manage a forest in their daily life. During the experiment, participants often drew 
parallels with their own experience. The experience gained using the local forest for 
                                                 
 
9
 Culture could have different meanings. Boone and Van Witteloostuijn (1999) presented culture as 
participants’ nationality, but culture could be also viewed as the origins of people having the same 
nationality. People with origin from southern societies (such as Africa, Asia and Hispanic America) 
have the same collectivist cultural background, whereas people from individualist western societies 
(such as Northern America and Western Europe) are more individualist (Cox et al., 1991). 
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extracting firewood, fibres or food, was helpful to resolve the social dilemma of the 
game. Cardenas (2003) provided some methodological lessons from his experiment. 
In particular, there are advantages of bringing the experimental lab to the field and 
learn from observing the wider variance in certain characteristics of the participants in 
the subject pool (e.g. their wealth), if compared to college students as usually done. 
The results obtained by Cardenas (2003) also have more external validity because he 
conducted the experiment in the field with participants for whom cooperation is an 
important dilemma faced each day10. 
 
Even if it seems that the use of non-students samples provide more robust results, it 
has many constraints. If one advantage of running experiments with students is that 
they are available and have free-time, then for non-students time is a scarce resource. 
Moreover, non-students cannot go to the experimental laboratory, but rather the 
laboratory has to go to the participants. Carpenter et al. (2004) ran sessions with 
workers at the end of the workday to minimize the time commitment of the 
participants. They provided a summary of the instructions before the experiment when 
recruiting volunteers. This allowed the experimenters to keep the experimental time to 
half an hour on average. 
1.3.2.1.3. Relationship between the players 
Carpenter et al (2004) studied the impact on subjects’ behaviour of the real-life social 
context11 in which the laboratory (experimental place) is embedded. More precisely, 
they stated that the social context refers to the relationship players have with the other 
participants and with the experimenter, and to the set of norms and habits that 
dominate the life in the institution in which the experiment is run: 
- Workers in the workplace see each other every day, often work together in teams, 
and can expect to continue working together for long periods of time. 
- Students, even in a small campus, are more likely to be in competition for grades, 
are likely to have less frequent interactions, and know that their time together on 
campus is limited. 
1.3.2.1.3.1. Anonymity 
Loewenstein (1999) argued that the motives that could influence behaviour could 
include the desire to behave in an appropriate fashion, conform to the expectations of 
the experimenter, or with the willing to appear as a smart (or at least not stupid) and 
good person, or to be the “winner”. Some experimental economists seem to believe 
that some of these motives can be eliminated through procedures that assure 
anonymity. People do behave differently when they believe they are being watched 
either by the experimenter or by the others players (Frank et al., 1993; Brosig, 2001). 
 
Rege and Telle (2004) framed a public good experiment. People decided individually 
how much to contribute to the public good, and then the contribution of each player 
was communicated. The authors designed two treatments of the experiment. In the 
first “approval” treatment, each player at a time had to reveal his own contribution in 
sight of all the other participants. In the second “no-approval” treatment, anonymity 
was fully insured. The experimenter communicated the contributions without 
                                                 
 
10
 A response to the external validity issue when running games with students could be given by 
Akpalu (2006). In his experiments, made with students from Ghana, one of the characteristics of many 
participants was that their families were dependent on natural resources for their livelihood. His study 
did not focus on this issue but could provide a research question for the future. 
11
 All the experimental context issues will be more detailed in part 1.3.2.2.3 
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revealing contributors identity. The authors found that people contributed less to the 
public good when playing anonymously, confirming the influence of anonymity on 
players’ behaviour. 
1.3.2.1.3.2. Communication among the players  
In an Experimental Economics laboratory, the participants of the experiment are 
affected to a box with a computer. The players are isolated by separations between the 
boxes and they cannot see each other. Generally, communication is prohibited and the 
players make their decision individually (Eber and Willinger, 2005). However, in 
some researches, for example those studying cooperation among the subjects, 
communication between the players could be allowed. 
 
In Cardenas’ (2003) CPR game run in the field, groups of eight people were 
constituted and faced the decision to use a same resource (i.e. a forest). The decision 
had to be made privately and individually. The game was divided into two phases. 
During the first phase, individuals made their choices on each round without 
communicating with the others. After the first phase, the experimenters stopped the 
game and announced a new set of rules for the following rounds, in which the group 
would be allowed to have a 5 minute open discussion12 before the decision for the 
next round. After the discussion, each member of the group returned to his individual 
desk and made his individual and still private decision. The results analysis showed 
that the introduction of face-to-face communication among group members had a 
positive impact on behaviour and earnings, despite the privacy of decisions. 
 
The conversations were video recorded to analyse how communication influences the 
efficiency of cooperation around forest management. The videos showed that some 
groups had conversations where one could feel closeness among the players, while 
others had more formal and distant conversations. For the most efficient group13, the 
communication was very “kind” from the very start of the second phase and was 
maintained over time. In other groups, the dialogue was much more difficult and cold, 
and the groups resulted less efficient. This result confirms the importance of 
communication on people’s behaviour, and more particularly on cooperation. 
Moreover, when analysing the reasons of kind or cold communication within a group, 
Cardenas (2003) found that the group homogeneity with respect to the wealth level of 
the members was the main reason that affected communication. When playing the 
game, “poor” people in the real life were suspicious against “rich” people. This 
finding is consistent with Loewenstein (1999) and Carpenter et al. (2004) conclusions 
about the effect of relationship among players and of the social context on players’ 
behaviour. 
1.3.2.2. Experimental Design Features 
Explanations and predictions by Economic theorists of people’s choices in every day 
life are generally based on the assumption of human rationality. The definition of 
rationality is much debated. The normative definition of decision rationality derives 
from the use of the principles of the Utility Theory. It is assumed that the rational 
principle governing utility maximization ensures that decisions are logically coherent 
                                                 
 
12
 The face-to-face communication could be about anything the players wanted on the game, but must 
not include any kind of threats or promises of transfers of points or cash after the game. 
13
 The most efficient group was the one which got the higher average earnings during the rounds 
divided by the maximum possible. 
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and consistent. One significant implication of this notion is that rational choice is 
uniform across all domains (Wang, 1996a). The choice is not affected by 
experimental content, it is not sensitive to context, and there are no specific features 
for processing particular kinds of tasks. 
 
However, this viewpoint was strongly challenged on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds. Many scholars have converged to the notion that human cognition consists 
on several domain-specific mechanisms (Wang, 1996a). Experimental economists 
highlighted more particularly three experimental features influencing human 
cognition: the incentives provided to the subjects to maximize their utility function, 
the framing (phrased) of the instructions, and the context of the experiment. 
1.3.2.2.1. Incentives 
Among all the rules of Experimental Economics, perhaps the most enforced is the use 
of monetary payments, which is seen as a way of maintaining strict control over 
individual motivations. However, this rule is controversial and many researchers 
criticize it (Loewenstein, 1999; Rubinstein, 2001). One of them is Read (2005) who 
claims that there is no basis for requiring systematically the use of real monetary 
incentives14 when doing Experimental Economics. 
1.3.2.2.1.1. Why using monetary incentives? 
Experimental Economists believe that the use of rewards allows them to control the 
incentives that operate in the experiments. As the Theory states, they follow the 
assumption that subjects are motivated by profit maximization. Therefore, with 
monetary rewards, it is expected that the players will behave in the sense of this 
theoretical claim (Loewenstein, 1999; Eber and Willinger, 2005; Read, 2005).  
 
One reason to use incentives is to motivate players to do their best in understanding 
the task of the game, and to behave seriously, giving honest responses15. The 
experimenters pay the participants because they want them to think harder. It is 
argued that increased understanding drives behaviour in the direction of the 
“normatively-correct” response (Wilcox, 1993; Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001; 
Kuhberger, 2002). However, incentives are not necessarily better to increase players’ 
understanding than other ways, such as writing better instructions with all the needed 
information or giving the players extra time (Read, 2005). 
 
Read (2005) studied the relevance of the use of monetary incentives in Experimental 
Economics. He did not treat whether incentives work, but rather he considered the 
fundamental question of how the incentives work. Before deciding to use incentives, it 
is necessary to think about why the incentive is likely to have an effect16, and what the 
alternative non-incentivised methods are. 
 
                                                 
 
14
 Real incentives are money in most of the experiments, but when players are students they could be 
also an improved mark for their exams (Brañas-Garza, 2006) or a reduction of the time to be spent in 
doing a task (Kuhberger, 2002). 
15
 The players will invest cognitive effort to avoid making judgement errors (Hertwig and Ortmann, 
2001). 
16
 While real world decisions invariably implies real losses as well as gains, the use of monetary 
incentives in the laboratory rarely allows the imposition of real losses. Research on the house money 
effect shows that people tend to take more risk on house money (Thaler and Johnson, 1990). 
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Incentives might do more than push the players to do more of what they are doing 
already. They can also change what players do. Actually, people have strong intrinsic 
motivations to do their best. By paying the players, the experimenters give extrinsic 
motives. Even if this loss of players’ motivation could be seen as a negative outcome, 
it might be exactly what the experimenter wants (Read, 2005). Intrinsic motivation is 
beyond the experimenter’s control, and actions that maximize “intrinsic payoffs” may 
not be the ones that would maximize “economic payoffs”. The extrinsic monetary 
incentive does not necessarily increase the level of motivation, but it might change its 
focus, thus making observed behaviour easier to interpret. Read (2005) stated this in 
more formal term: 
 
A monetary incentive is one of many sources of utility, among entertainment, altruism, self-
esteem, etc. The decision-maker’s goals can be summarized as follows: 
 
Max u($,EE) 
with  
Money: $=f(choice)  
and everything else: EE=f(choice) 
 
By introducing monetary incentives, the weight put on money is increased. Ideally, the result 
is a single argument utility function u($), so that if people are maximizing their earnings they 
are also maximizing their utility. One goal of using financial incentives, therefore, is to 
‘crowd out’ other incentives. 
 
As stated by Economic Theory, rational subjects look for optimising their economic 
payoffs (i.e. their profit or their income). If the experimenter’s objective is to test the 
theoretical definition of players’ rationality, then the use of monetary incentives is a 
good way to validate it. Monetary incentives in experiments could produce an 
illustration that if people are paid to do something, they are more likely to do it. Read 
(2005) suggested that it is not interesting to show that money can motivate people, but 
it is rather interesting to study if non-monetary motives (i.e. the “everything else” 
factor in the utility function) can also motivate decision-makers. 
 
The use of monetary incentives could have a consequence on the reliability of the 
results. Hertwig and Ortmann (2001) considered that incentivised studies contain less 
error and are better than non-incentivised studies. They argued “the benefits of being 
able to run many studies do not outweigh the costs of generating results of 
questionable reliability”. Read (2005) answered that it is difficult to estimate at what 
point the benefit from doing many studies outweighs the benefits of generating 
‘better’ ones. Monetary incentives is one of the tools researchers can use and the 
decision to employ monetary incentives, like any other research decision, should be 
made according to what the researcher wants to achieve using them. 
1.3.2.2.1.2. How to calculate monetary incentives? 
There are monetary costs when using monetary incentives. The use of monetary 
incentives increases the budget of the research, and limits the number of experiments 
conducted. The total amount of the monetary incentives could be so expensive that it 
could be a heavy constraint that decreases the possibility of replication of an 
experiment and then affects its external validity. The amount of the monetary 
incentives has to be chosen high enough to motivate the players and low enough to 
run many experiments. 
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A way to reduce the monetary cost of conducting experiments with monetary rewards 
is to pay randomly the participants at the end of the game. Among all the players, only 
one part will receive a payment at the end of the experiment (Eber and Willinger, 
2005). Another method is to pay partially the players, only on a part of all the 
outcomes they obtained. Akpalu (2006) run an experiment divided in two games and 
he followed the “within-subjects” procedure (i.e. each player participated to the two 
games). He rewarded the players according to their outcomes only in one of the two 
games. At the end of the experiment, a toss with a coin designated for each participant 
which outcome would be the basis for the calculation of the monetary reward. 
1.3.2.2.2. Framing effect 
The term framing was introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and used to 
indicate the fact that simple and unspectacular changes in the wording of decision 
problems can lead to preference reversals. Kuhberger (1998) provided a deep analysis 
of the influence of framing on risky decisions, giving a survey over 15 years of 
research on the framing effect. He gave the term framing two definitions, a “strict” 
one and a “loose” one. 
 
- the strict definition relates to the wording of a formally same problem, i.e. to a semantic 
manipulation of prospects whereby the exact same situation is simply re-described 
(Tversky and Kagel, 1981; Brañas-Garza, 2006). 
- the loose definition of framing refers to an internal event that can be induced not only by 
semantic manipulations, but may result also from other contextual features of a situation 
and from individual factors, provided that problems are equivalent from the perspective of 
Economic Theory (Wang, 1996a; Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 1999). 
 
Among different framing problems, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) used the life-
death decision model in which a certain number of people were described as being 
infected by a fatal disease. Two treatment plans were available. The first plan would 
result in a deterministic outcome that led to the sure survival for 1/3 of the patients. 
The second plan resulted in a probabilistic outcome that led to a 1/3 probability that 
the entire patient group would survive and a 2/3 probability that no one would 
survive. Subjects had to choose among the two treatment plans according to their 
preference for the outcomes associated with each plan.  
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) (below called as TK) used a life-death decision 
problem that involved 600 anonymous hypothetical patients. When the choice was 
framed positively in terms of number of people who would be saved, 72% of their 
subjects chose the deterministic (sure) outcome. In contrast, when the choice 
outcomes were framed negatively in terms of number of people who would die, 78 % 
of the subjects chose the probabilistic (risky) outcome. This result demonstrates that 
seemingly inconsequent changes in the formulation of choice problems cause 
significant shifts of preference. 
 
After a meta-analysis over a large number of publications on framing effect during 15 
years, Kuhberger (1998) found that student samples dominate framing research. 
Students and non-students do not differ in their receptivity to the framing effect. 
Although students (considered as ‘candid’ persons) and experts might differ in a 
variety of ways, experts are also influenced by framing even if maybe to a lesser 
degree than students. Therefore, Kuhberger (1998) concluded that students are not 
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misled, with respect to framing, when involved in an Experimental Economics 
exercise. 
1.3.2.2.3. Context Issue 
A common agreement among experimenters in the EE research field is to conduct 
experiments in a lab and to make the context of the experimental instructions as 
neutral as possible. It is argued that the experimenter looses control of the 
experimental parameters, since players have different interpretations of a real context. 
The reasoning is that a real context might contaminate behaviour, and then any 
observed behaviour could not be used to test general theories (Harrison and List, 
2004; Eber and Willinger, 2005). The idea is that the players have a same perception 
of a general and neutral issue. For example each one could interpret differently an 
Economic context issue, such as two players respectively named ‘seller’ and ‘buyer’ 
in an auction or ultimatum game, or ‘monopolist’ and ‘entrant’ in a market game. In a 
context generalization, they become ‘player A’ and ‘player B’ in the experimental 
instructions (Cooper and Kagel, 2003). In their PD game design, Boone and Van 
Witteloostuijn (1999) did not use usual terms as “compete”, “cooperate”, “defect” and 
“sucker” to insure a neutral instruction setting. 
 
However, it is not strictly true that subjects have the same perception of a neutral 
context. In the middle of the twentieth century some behavioural economists desired 
to expunge context conducting experiments in “ ‘context free’ temperature and 
sound-regulated white egg-shaped enclosures” (Loewenstein, 1999). But an egg-
shaped cage provides the same amount of context (with somewhat more alien) as any 
other environment. Cognitive Psychology states that all forms of thinking and 
problem solving are context-dependent, including tasks as language-comprehension. 
Instead, real referents can avoid subjects’ confusion about the experimental task 
(Loewenstein, 1999). Loomes (1999b) claimed that “the dangers of constructing 
experimental environments so stripped of context are that participants search 
desperately for cues about the kind of behaviour that might seem sensible, or that they 
think the experimenters might be looking for, with the result that they fail to process 
the tasks as they would do in the richer social environment that may be sought to 
model”. In other words, subjects may seem like zero intelligence agents when they 
are placed in the unfamiliar and abstract context of an experiment. If the subjects do 
not understand what the experimental task is about, meaning that they do not know 
what actions are feasible and what are the consequences of different actions, then 
control is lost at a basic level (Pillutla and Chen, 1999). Nevertheless, it must also be 
recognized that inappropriate choice of field referents may trigger uncontrolled 
psychological motivations. The choice between an abstract context and one with field 
referents must be guided by the research question (Harrison and List, 2004). 
1.3.2.2.3.1. The importance of experimental context 
As a result of their experience with experimental games experimental economists are 
progressively gaining an appreciation of the importance of context effects. For 
example, the same game can be presented as a matter of selling and buying, or as a 
problem of resource allocation. The way the game is presented, though, may have a 
considerable impact on the players’ behaviour. This is a direct consequence of the fact 
that each person has his own representation of a market or of a common pool resource 
(Eber and Willinger, 2005). There is a variety of alternatives to de-contextualise a 
game, such as describing a forest or a dam with water as being a “common pool” with 
tokens (Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 1999), but sometimes there is no way to remove 
completely the context of a game. In the TK’s life-death model, it is difficult to 
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present the game without the disease, which is an important element of context. There 
is no really ‘neutral’ presentation of this game. If the experimenter removes the 
disease from the context of the game, then the experiment does not follow the life-
death model and it is another game. Therefore, in such cases, the experimenters must 
attempt to understand the effect of the context more than eliminate it from the 
instructions. 
 
In order to examine the real context effect underlying the subjects’ preferences, Wang 
(1996a) did not remove the experimental context. Instead, he put a higher level of 
contextualization in the experiment. He introduced a social important contextual 
element, the family group, into the life-death decision problem, by specifying 
identities to patients of the small group (originally composed by “hypothetical 
anonymous” patients). The subjects were assigned to a more concrete situation where 
the 6 members of the group are relatives. Regardless of how the outcomes were 
framed (either positively or negatively), the majority of subjects in both situation 
(72% in saving-life case and 94% in losing-life situation) preferred the probabilistic 
(risky) outcome. This result showed that in a small group, deterministic outcome of 
certainly losing group members might be emotionally unacceptable, particularly when 
the members are relatives. The probabilistic outcome provides a “fair” chance, giving 
everybody in the family group an equal chance to survive. Decision rationality seems 
to be specific to the perception of the problem (familiar versus anonymous patients) 
and more generally, Wang (1996a) stated that decision rationality seems to be 
context-specific. 
1.3.2.2.3.2. Weak and strong context effects 
Cooper and Kagel (2003) studied the context impact on decision rationality by 
studying subjects’ strategic play through a game based on the limit pricing model. In 
this game, a potential entrant faces a monopolist with either high or low costs. The 
entrant only wishes to enter the industry if he believes the monopolist has high costs. 
While the entrant cannot observe directly the monopolist’s costs, he observes the 
monopolist’s output decision before choosing whether or not to enter the industry. 
The monopolist has an incentive to strategically manipulate the output in order to 
change the entrants’ beliefs about its true costs. Cooper and Kagel (2003) conducted 
two kinds of experiments, one articulated around an abstract context, and another in 
which the context is meaningful. In the “generic” treatments (i.e. with an abstract 
context), monopolists and entrants were described as respectively ‘player A’ and 
‘player B’ and other terms were generalized in order to give the instructions a 
meaningless context. In the meaningful context, colloquial terms were used to avoid 
any “value laden” language. Thus the monopolist was referred to the “existing firm” 
and the potential entrant became the “other firm”. 
 
Cooper and Kagel (2003) postulated two possible effects of the context on the 
subjects’ behaviour. They hypothesized a first effect of the context on a “low” level, 
where the context might serve as a catalyst, speeding up the learning process without 
changing the reasoning process. They called it the “weak context effects”. They also 
hypothesized that there might exist “strong context effects”, where the context not 
only speeds up the learning process, but also impacts on subjects’ reasoning 
processes. The results were consistent with the presence of weak context effects. They 
also found some suggestion of strong context effects (the meaningful context seemed 
to stimulate more sophisticated reasoning) in the data, although this evidence was far 
from conclusive because it was observed on a relatively small amount of data. 
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They concluded that because of weak context effects, the use of meaningful context is 
likely to speed up convergence to equilibrium in Economic experiments. 
Consequently, sharper results are observed in a meaningful context, which is more 
representative of what is expected to be seen in the field. This result questions about 
the standard methodology of using generic context in Experimental Economics. 
Moreover, the external validity issue is not compatible with engaging in attempts to 
eliminate context in experimental instructions. The goal of external validity could be 
served by creating in a lab an experimental context that is similar to the one in which 
Economic agents will actually operate. One might be able to modify the lab 
experimental design to mimic the field contexts more reliably and then this 
contextualization would provide a more robust application to the experimental method 
in general (Loewenstein, 1999; Harrison and List, 2004). According to these 
observations, the use of contextualized experiments seems to be more useful to study 
agents’ behaviour. 
1.3.2.2.4. Comparing results of experiments 
An important methodological issue concerns the choice of the treatment procedure 
when the experimental objective is to compare players’ behaviour within different 
situations. The results obtained after running two treatments (i.e. protocol versions) 
could be compared through two procedures: 
- The between-subjects procedure consists of comparing the results obtained through 
playing with two subjects’ samples. Each subject faces only one treatment of the 
experiment (Wang, 1996a). 
- The within-subject procedure consists of comparing the behaviour of a same sample 
in the two treatments. Each subject plays the two treatments (Kuhberger et al., 
2002; Cooper and Kagel, 2003; Gachter et al., 2004). 
 
 
 
The experimental protocol developed in this Master thesis (cf. Chapter 3) was 
designed by taking into account all the methodological aspects of EE presented in this 
part. We focused more particulalry on the context issue to answer the research 
question: can we use a RPG derived from a negotiation process as a contextualized 
laboratory experiment to test hypotheses? The simplified RPG will be used to test 
CGT hypotheses. The theoretical model that underlies the experimental design is 
presented in the following chapter (cf. Chapter 2). 
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Chapter 2: The CGT Model 
The CGT model presented in this chapter derives from the one developed in the Kat 
River Basin (Dinar et al., 2006). Three farmers share water stored in a dam to irrigate 
their production of cabbage17. This chapter presents the model framework, the 
variables, the values and the functions tested during the second session (for the first 
version, cf annex A). The different calibrations of the CGT model and the hypotheses 
tested during the game are stated at the end of this chapter. 
2.1. The CGT Model* (V2)18 
Three farmers (i = 1,2,3) produce irrigated cabbage. Each farmer has a cultivated area 
of 20 Ha (S0i). The annual amount of water/Ha to reach an optimum yield (Yi) 
corresponds to (Wm) and it is the same for all farmers. Lower watering/Ha induces a 
reduction of Yi following the response functions indicated in the following table. 
Wm* S0i = W0i is available to all farmers from rainfall plus water reservoirs present in 
each farm. 
 
Production costs/Ha (C) are the same for all farmers and are independent of Yi. 
Farmer’s i profit/Ha (Πi) is calculated as: Πi=Yi*P-Ci. Values for Y, P, C, Wm are 
provided in the following table. 
 
 Y 
(Bags/Ha) 
Wm 
(m3/Ha) 
P 
(ZAR) 
C 
(ZAR/Ha) 
Response 
functions 
Farmer 1 3198 9100 6 16445 Y1=1200+0.2196*W1 
Farmer 2 3198 9100 6 16445 Y2=600+0.2855*W2 
Farmer 3 3800 9100 6 16445 Y3=1200+0.2857*W3 
Table 3. CGT Model - Version 2 - Farmers’ parameters 
Each farmer can decide to extend his irrigated cabbage area, which becomes S1i. A 
maximum additional area of 20 Ha/farmer can be allocated. This would bring the max 
total area/farm (S1i max) to 40 Ha. 
 
A dam with a capacity of 350 000 m3 (D) can be used to irrigate increased surfaces 
cultivated at cabbage (S1i). W1i is the amount of water required by each farmer to 
irrigate S1i . 250 000 m3/year can be used for irrigation, whereas 100 000 m3 represent 
the Reserve (R). R must be allocated to human consumptions and ecological purposes. 
 
                                                 
 
17
 The context is more detailed below in the following chapter (cf. Chapter 3) 
 
*
 This model was developed by S. Farolfi and F. Patrone. The mathematic formalization of this model 
is still provisional. 
 
18
 The model version 1 (V1) is presented in the annex. V1 was tested during the 1st session of the 
laboratory experiment test and resulted in a game where players felt frustrated for not receiving all the 
information about the water allocation rules. The only difference between V2 and V1 is the rule of 
water allocation from the dam and the consequent assumption on the players’ behaviour. In V1 players 
decide about areas to cultivate without having received from the dam manager precise information 
about the water they will be allocated from the dam. They therefore play in a situation of uncertainty. 
In V2, the players first ask for water and only after having received from the dam manager a reply on 
their water allocation from the dam. 
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Each farmer will base his decision to increase his irrigated surface by S1i - S0i =∆Si, 
and therefore to increase Πi, on the possible additional amount of water available for 
him from the dam (W1i-W0i =∆Wi). 
 
Farmers can require water from the dam either individually, or forming coalitions 
(partial or grand). Every singleton or coalition will first require water from the dam. If 
the sum of all requirements is higher than 250 000 m3, then each singleton or coalition 
will receive a maximum of water share corresponding to 1/3 (singleton) or 2/3 (partial 
coalition) of the 250 000 m3 (19). Once received from the dam manager a confirmation 
of the water available from the dam for himself, each player will decide the surface to 
irrigate. When forming a partial coalition or the grand coalition, one farmer can 
transfer water to another member in order to irrigate the other’s additional area. 
 
Every player will consider other players to be rational and willing to maximize their 
profit, and therefore requiring at least 1/3 of the available water from the dam. 
In this first model, water from the dam has no cost. 
 
Side payments are allowed within coalition, meaning that the members can choose to 
share the profit obtained by the coalition between all of them. 
 
The problem can be formulated as follows: 
 
N = {1,2,3} 
 
D = 350 000  
R = 100 000 
 
S0i = 20 
S1i max = 40 
 
Π0i= Πi∗ S0i 
 
Single Players: 
 
v(1)20 = Π01+X1; X1 (∆S1, ∆W1)     
v(2) = Π02+X2; X2 (∆S2, ∆W2) 
v(3) = Π03+X3; X3 (∆S3, ∆W3) 
with Xi being the profit obtained by farmer i from cultivating additional area 
Remaining Water in the Dam (WD) = R = 100 000 
                                                 
 
19
 In the version 2 played during the first test (12th June) it was: “If the sum of all requirements is 
higher than 250 000 m3, then each singleton or coalition will receive a share of the 250 000 m3 
proportional to the weight of his/her requirement on the total requirements”. It is interesting to note 
that if all players play “rationally”, the two sub-versions 2 bring to the same result (e.g.: 1/3 of 250 000 
m3 to each player when singletons and 2/3 to the partial coalitions). 
20
 Coalitions and payoffs are noted as follows: 
- the partial coalition formed by the farmers 1 and 2 is noted {1,2}, the one formed by farmers 1 
and 3 is noted {1,3} and the last formed by farmers 2 and 3 is noted {2,3}; the grand coalition 
formed by the three farmers is noted {1,2,3}. 
- payoffs of the singletons are noted as: v(1), v(2), v(3); payoffs of partial coalitions are noted 
as: v(1,2), v(1,3), v(2,3); payoff of grand coalition is noted as: v(1,2,3). 
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Partial Coalitions21: 
V(1) = Π01+X1; X1 (∆S1, ∆W1) 
V(2,3) = Π02+Π03+X2,3; X2,3(∆S 2,3, ∆W 2,3) 
with X2,3 being the profit obtained by the partial coalition {2,3} from cultivating 
additional area 
WD = R = 100 000 
 
V(2) = Π02+X2; X2 (∆S2, ∆W2) 
V(1,3) = Π01+Π03+X1,3; X1,3(∆S1,3, ∆W 1,3) 
with X1,3 being the profit obtained by the partial coalition {1,3} from cultivating 
additional area 
WD = R = 100 000 
 
V(3) = Π03+X3; X3(∆S3, ∆W3) 
V(1,2) = Π01+Π02+X1,2; X1,2(∆S1,2, ∆W1,2) 
with X1,2 being the profit obtained by the partial coalition {1,2} from cultivating 
additional area 
WD = 100 000 
 
Grand Coalition: 
V(1,2,3) = Π01+Π02+Π03+X1,2,3; X1,2,3(∆S1,2,3, ∆W1,2,3) 
with X1,2,3 being the profit obtained by the grand coalition {1,2,3} from cultivating 
additional area 
WD = 100 000 
 
The interest in the grand coalition is to check: a) are the farmers able to maximize the 
payoff of the coalition (side payments); b) how do they allocate water among players 
in a coalition (bargaining?); c) how the payoff will be distributed among farmers? 
Will this correspond to the Shapley value of the CGT model? 
                                                 
 
21
 Interest here is to check: a) are they able to maximize the payoff o the coalition (side payments); b) 
how do they allocate water among players in a coalition (bargaining?). 
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2.2. Calibration of the model and expected 
results 
The Shapley value is a one-point solution presented above in the text (cf. part 1.2.2.2). 
 
Let N be a finite set of n players, S a subset of N composed by s players, and v the payoff 
obtained. Shapley proposed that there exists a unique value  that satisfies the conditions 
of efficiency, dummy player property, anonymity and additivity (cf. Parrachino et al., 
2006a). For all i  N: 
i(v) =  [s! (n-s-1)!]* [ v(S U {i}) – v(S) ] / n!  
 
The Shapley value could be interpreted as follows: 
Considering any permutation  of the set N and any player i  N. If P(i, ) is the set of 
players that precede i in the permutation , M(i, ) = v(P(i, )U{i}) – v(P(i, )) is the 
marginal contribution of i to the coalition P(i, ). The Shapley value will be: 
 
i(v) = 1/n!   M(i, ) 
 
Considering a situation with n players agreeing to meet in a certain room, imagine the n 
players entering one at a time into that room in a random order (specified by the 
permutation ) and that each player, as soon as he enters and reaches the coalition S 
created by the players arrived before him, receives a reward equal to v(SU{i})-v(S), that 
is his marginal contribution. 
 
The Shapley value is the mean marginal contribution, averaged on all of the n! 
permutations . 
 
Adopting the parameters indicated and considering the players are rational and profit 
takers, the following results can be expected in terms of payoffs: 
 
value of the 
coalition
sum of Shapley 
values for 
players in the 
coalition
V(1) 79958 87524 In the Core
V(2) 79958 87524 In the Core
V(3) 185258 209362 In the Core
V(1,2) 159944 175048 In the Core
V(1,3) 298320 296886 Not in the Core
V(2,3) 298320 296886 Not in the Core
V(1,2,3) 384410 384410 In the Core
 
Table 4. Theoretical payoffs and the corresponding Shapley values (with 
farmer 3 more productive) 
In table 4, the Shapley values are 1 = 2 = 87 524 and 3 = 209 362.Therefore, we 
have 1,2 = 1 + 2 = 175 048,   1,3 = 1 + 3 = 2,3 = 2 + 3 = 296 886. 
In this example, the Shapley values are calculated as follows (cf. table 5): 
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Marginal contribution of player j to the coalition
Permutation 1 2 3
123 79958 79986 224466
132 79958 86090 218362
213 79986 79958 224466
231 86090 79958 218362
312 113062 86090 185258
321 86090 113062 185258
Total 525144 525144 1256172
Shapley value 87524 87524 209362
 
Table 5. Calculation of the Shapley value 
Considering the first permutation  = 123: 
 M(1, 123) = v(1) – v(Ø) = v(1) = 79 958  
 M(2, 123) = v(1,2) – v(1) = 159 944 – 79 958 = 79 958 
 M(3, 123) = v(1,2,3) – v(1,2) = 384 410 – 159 944 = 224 466 
In that case, there are 6 equi-probable permutations . The Shapley value is the mean 
on the marginal contributions: 
 1(v) = 1/6   M(1, ) = 525 144 / 6 = 87 524 
 2(v) = 1/6   M(2, ) = 525 144 / 6 = 87 524 
 3(v) = 1/6   M(3, ) = 1 256 172 / 6 = 209 362 
 
If we look at the results when farmer 3 is even more productive (response function for 
farmer 3: Y3=1200+0.4500*W3), the following results can be expected in terms of 
payoffs: 
 
value of the 
coalition
sum of Shapley 
values for 
players in the 
coalition
V(1) 79958 106273 In the Core
V(2) 79958 106273 In the Core
V(3) 446724 530664 In the Core
V(1,2) 159944 212546 In the Core
V(1,3) 641961 636937 Not in the Core
V(2,3) 641961 636937 Not in the Core
V(1,2,3) 743210 743210 In the Core
 
Table 6. Theoretical payoffs and the corresponding Shapley values (with 
farmer 3 even more productive) 
In both calibrations, the conditions of super-additivity of this game are respected, as:  
 
 v(1) + v(2) = v(1,2);   v(2,3)  v(2) + v(3)   and   v(1,3)  v(1) + v(3); 
 v(1,2,3)  v(1) + v(2) + v(3);   v(1,2,3)  v(1,2) + v(3);   v(1,2,3)  v(1,3) + 
v(2) and v(1,2,3)  v(2,3) + v(1). 
 
Nevertheless, in this CGT model, the Shapley values are such that 1 + 3 < v(1,3); 
and 2 + 3 < v(2,3). Therefore the Shapley value does not belong to the core (cf. 
tables in annex C10). Note, however, that the core is non-empty. For example, the 
allocation (90 000, 90 000, 563 210) is in the core, as can be easily checked. 
 
Because farmer 3 is more productive, the fact that the two coalitions including farmer 
3 would have interest in staying out of the grand coalition seems quite obvious.  
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In fact, the same result is obtained if the game is calibrated with farmer 3 less 
productive.  
 
If farmer 3 is less productive (response function farmer 3: Y3=1200+0.2* W3), the 
following results can be expected in terms of payoffs: 
 
value of the 
coalition
sum of Shapley 
values for 
players in the 
coalition
V(1) 79958 81596 In the Core
V(2) 79958 81596 In the Core
V(3) 48908 55378 In the Core
V(1,2) 159944 163192 In the Core
V(1,3) 138557 136974 Not in the Core
V(2,3) 138557 136974 Not in the Core
V(1,2,3) 218570 218570 In the Core
 
Table 7. Theoretical payoffs and the corresponding Shapley values (with 
farmer 3 less productive) 
If farmer 3 is even less productive (response function farmer 3: Y3=1200+0.19* W3), 
the following results can be expected in terms of payoffs: 
 
value of the 
coalition
sum of Shapley 
values for 
players in the 
coalition
V(1) 79958 82430 In the Core
V(2) 79958 82430 In the Core
V(3) 32987 42790 In the Core
V(1,2) 159944 164860 In the Core
V(1,3) 127636 125220 Not in the Core
V(2,3) 127636 125220 Not in the Core
V(1,2,3) 207650 207650 In the Core
 
Table 8. Theoretical payoffs and the corresponding Shapley values (with 
farmer 3 even less productive) 
The results therefore indicate that, provided that players play rationally and are profit 
takers, the game is always super-additive, but the Shapley allocation is not in the core. 
An interesting feature is represented by the fact that in all cases (farmer 3 more 
productive and less productive) the two coalitions including farmer 3 would have a 
slightly higher payoff by staying alone compared with the Shapley value they would 
receive in the grand coalition. 
 
The experimental set-up that follows aims at testing the Cooperative Game Theory 
hypotheses that lie behind these results.  
 
The experiments will be specifically designed to test:  
 
1) Players’ rationality (selfishness) and profit maximization;  
2) Players’ capacity to take advantage of the side payments in coalitions;  
3) Players’ behaviour in terms of resources (water, land) allocation within a coalition;  
4) Players’ choice to stay in partial or grand coalition (because of the particular case 
of this game); 
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5) If players stay in the grand coalition, allocation of coalition’s payoff in comparison 
with the Shapley values. 
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Chapter 3: The contextualized experimental 
protocol building 
Most Experimental Economics exercises aim at testing hypotheses derived from a 
theoretical model. The objective of this study is to test Cooperative Game Theory 
(CGT) hypotheses. A CGT model derived from a Role-Playing Game used in a 
development project (Kat Aware) was designed by S. Farolfi and F. Patrone (cf. 
chapter 2) and was the basis to build an experiment articulated around the water 
management issue. The overall research question treated by this study is whether such 
contextualized experiment is useful to test theoretical hypotheses. The water 
management context was therefore maintained in the experimental design. 
 
In the game used for the experiment and described here below, water is used for 
irrigation, domestic uses and ecological purposes. The subjects of the experiment play 
the role of farmers. They have to make decisions implying the allocation of 
commonly owned water and the choice of cultivated areas. Farmers play alone at the 
first stage of the game, then they play within partial coalitions and finally together in a 
grand coalition. 
 
The experiment is specifically designed to test the CGT hypotheses presented in the 
previous chapter (cf. Chapter 2) 
 
As the experiment is based on a CGT model, the CGT vocabulary is used in the 
following text. However, the players were not faced with this vocabulary. The 
theoretical terms were changed into more colloquial words. For example, terms as 
‘partial coalition’ and ‘grand coalition’ were named respectively “informal group 
decision” and “irrigation board” (cf. instructions in annexes B1, B2 and B3). 
3.1. The Experiment 
The experiment consists in a water resource management game. Water is stored in a 
dam. Three farmers, cabbage cultivators, can require water from the dam to irrigate 
more area than their initial endowment.  
 
The game was a one-shot round, meaning that the farmers play only one period, 
corresponding to one year. 
 
The farmers have the same initial area endowment (20 Ha) but they had different 
production functions. Each farmer may increase his cultivated area to a maximum of 
40 Ha (initial 20 Ha + additional 20 Ha). If a farmer chooses to increase the cultivated 
area, he needs water from the dam. In that case, he must ask the dam manager (played 
by the experimenter) the amount of water needed. 
 
Therefore, the farmer’s decision is made at two, interrelated, levels: the additional 
area to cultivate and the amount of water needed from the dam.  
 
The dam has a capacity of 350 000 m3 of which 100 000 m3 must be preserved for 
domestic consumption and the ecological reserve. 
 
The experiment is composed of three phases.  
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During the first phase, the three farmers play as singletons. They choose the area to 
cultivate and the corresponding water required without communication with the other 
farmers (cf. instructions in annex B1). 
 
During the second phase, two farmers play together in a partial coalition whilst the 
third farmer still plays alone. The partial coalition is presented to the farmers as an 
“informal group” (cf. instructions in annex B2). The farmers forming the partial 
coalition choose together the area cultivated by each one and the amount of water they 
required. The profit obtained is common between the two farmers and side-
payments22 are allowed. 
 
The second phase is composed of three independent rounds: 
Round 1: farmer 3 plays alone whilst farmers 1 and 2 play in a coalition. 
Round 2: farmer 2 plays alone whilst farmers 1 and 3 play in a coalition. 
Round 3: farmer 1 plays alone whilst farmers 2 and 3 play in a coalition. 
 
Finally, in the third phase, the three players play together in a grand coalition. The 
same cooperative principle as in the second phase with two farmers is generalized to 
the group including all the farmers. The grand coalition is presented to the players as 
an “irrigation board” (cf. instructions in annex B3), and consequently the farmers in 
the board manage collectively the water available from the dam.  
 
After having played the three phases, the players receive the results from each phase 
in terms of profit. On the basis of these results, they choose whether they prefer to be 
in a coalition or not and, if all the players want to be in the grand coalition, they are 
required to share the corresponding payoff. 
3.2. First Test Session - 12th of June 2007 
The test session was conducted the 12th of June 2007 by two researchers (the 
experimenter and an assistant) in a classroom with 6 Master students of the University 
of Pretoria. One week before, a first presentation of the game was given to the 
students. Each student received a copy of the instructions and the farmers’ roles were 
distributed. Therefore, the students already knew the general framework of the game 
before coming to the real test session. 
 
The following scheme (Figure 1) was drawn on the black board. The scheme indicates 
that the three farmers, each getting initially 20 Ha and having the possibility to extend 
the area to cultivate cabbage up to a maximum surface of 40 Ha, are connected to the 
dam by an individual channel. The dam contains 350 000 m3 of water, of which 
                                                 
 
22
 The side-payments theory is based on the assumed assumption than “the coalitional utility function 
is expressed in units of a divisible commodity which stores utility, and which can be transferred 
without losses to the players”. If a coalition can obtain a total utility, this utility can be divided among 
the members of the coalition in any possible way. It is possible to transfer money among the players in 
order to reallocate the profit gained through the coalition. Such games satisfying these assumptions are 
called “transferable-utility games” (Parrachino I., Zara S., Patrone F. – 2006 - Cooperative Game 
Theory and its application to natural, environmental and Water resource issues: 1. Basic Theory, 
World Bank policy research working paper 4072).  
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250 000 are available for irrigation. No upstream-downstream effect is observable in 
the game set-up. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Scheme of the game 
The six participants were divided into 3 groups of two persons each (cf. pictures in 
annex B8). Each group played the role of a farmer and was located at three corners of 
the laboratory (the classroom). 
 
Each group had a laptop open on a simple excel program prepared by the 
experimenter to help the players making their decisions. The experimenter also got a 
laptop with an Excel program to follow the game and to calculate the payoffs 
according to the farmers’ choices. 
 
The farmers could calculate their profit by introducing the additional area they wanted 
to cultivate and the water required from the dam in the corresponding cells of the 
program. The program calculated automatically the profit (cf. the Excel sheet in annex 
B5). The players therefore could produce different scenarios modifying the irrigated 
surface and the corresponding water needs. After having tested different scenarios, 
players made their choice. 
 
The farmers’ decision was communicated to the experimenter through an individual 
decision sheet (one per farmer). The decision sheet was a piece of paper composed by 
two cells; one was reserved for the farmer’s water request, and the other for the 
additional area the farmer wanted to cultivate (cf. annex B4). A new decision sheet 
was distributed before the beginning of each phase and was collected after the farmers 
made their decision. The information contained in the decision sheet was used by the 
experimenter to calculate the total amount of required water, the consequent water 
allocation following the allocation rules (cf. part 3.2.1), and the profit obtained by the 
three farmers. 
 
During the first phase, the farmers played alone as singletons all in the same room and 
at the same time. 
 
DAM 
250 000 m3 
100 000 m3 
20 Ha 
Farmer 1 Farmer 3 
Farmer 2 
20 Ha 
20 Ha 
Max =40 Ha 
Reserve 
Available for 
irrigation 
Max =40 Ha 
Max =40 Ha 
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During the second phase, the two farmers forming the partial coalition remained in the 
main room, while the third player was accompanied by the assistant to another room 
and played alone. This was repeated three times (rounds) to allow all possible 
combinations.  
 
During the third phase, all the farmers played together in the grand coalition. 
 
Every singleton or coalition was allowed to use the Excel tool prepared by the 
experimenter to help him or her in making his or her decision. 
3.2.1. The two versions of the game 
Two versions of this game were tested the one after the other with the same 6 
students. The difference between the two versions lies on the mechanism of water 
allocation followed by the dam manager and the uncertainty in the decision made by 
the farmer. 
 
In the first version, the dam manager allocated the water required by the farmers with 
the only constraint represented by the maximum capacity of the dam. The respect of 
the domestic and ecological “reserve” was not compulsory. The farmers did not know 
how the dam manager would allocate water. The only rule the farmers knew was that 
there was a priority order and that they probably would not be the first to be supplied. 
Therefore, the farmers chose how much additional area to cultivate without knowing 
if they would obtain the whole amount of water needed to irrigate it. The farmers had 
to choose if and how much to increase the irrigated area under uncertainty. 
 
In the second version, the dam manager’s allocation rules were transparent and 
known by the farmers. Unlike in the first version, the domestic and ecological 
reserves were respected. The allocation rule was as follows: if the total water required 
by the three farmers was lower than the amount of water available (i.e. 250 000 m3), 
each farmer would receive exactly the amount of water required. If the total water 
required was higher than the amount of water available, the dam manager distributed 
the water available among the three farmers proportionally to their original demand. 
 
For example, if the requests for farmers 1, 2 and 3 were respectively 50 000 m3, 
100 000 m3 and 150 000 m3, the total amount of water required is equal to 300 000 m3 
(which is higher than the 250 000 m3 available). Consequently, the dam manager 
would divide the 250 000 m3 available proportionally to their requests among the 
three farmers. Therefore the amounts allocated would be 41 666 m3, 83 333 m3 and 
125 000 m3 for farmers 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
 
Unlike in the first version, the farmers required first water from the dam, and then 
they were informed on the amount they would receive. Only at this point the farmers 
decided whether or not to extend their cultivated area. Farmers’ choice regarding the 
extension of cultivated areas took place with no uncertainty in this version. 
 
The following table (table 8) summarizes the common framework for the two versions 
of the experiment. The differences between the two versions are highlighted at the 
bottom of the table. A detailed description of the test phases is provided in annex B6. 
 
The first version was video-recorded to save a copy of the experiment. 
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Common framework of the experiment 
 
Phase Name Round Description 
1 SINGLETONS  Farmers 1, 2 and 3 played alone 
1 Farmers 1 and 2 played together; Farmer 3 played alone 
2 Farmers 1 and 3 played together;  Farmer 2 played alone 2 
PARTIAL 
COALITIONS 
3 Farmers 2 and 3 played together;  Farmer 1 played alone 
3 GRAND COALITION  Farmers 1, 2 and 3 played together 
 
Differences between the two versions of the experiment 
 
First version Second version 
Dam water allocation rules 
Unknown priority order in water allocation 
 The farmers did not know the water 
allocation rules followed by the dam manager 
Proportional water allocation 
 The farmers knew the water allocation rules 
followed by the dam manager 
Farmers’ decision making process 
The farmer’s water request and the decision on 
the additional area to cultivate were formulated 
at the same time  
 Uncertainty on the farmers’ choice 
The farmer first formulated the water request, 
and then the dam manager informed the farmer 
about water allocation. Only at this point the 
farmer decided about the additional area to 
cultivate. The decision was made in two steps 
 No uncertainty behind farmers’ choice 
Table 9. Common framework and differences between the two versions of 
the first test session 
3.2.2. Results 
3.2.2.1. General observations 
The first version of the experiment lasted 81 minutes (1h21) and the second one 61 
minutes (1h01) (cf. details in annex B7). The participants did not receive monetary 
rewards at the end of the test. Generally the participants understood quickly and 
completely the game. The Excel program proved to be a useful tool to help the players 
in their decision-making process. There were no problems with the numbers or the 
calculations. Only one mistake was observed. The players also allocated properly (i.e. 
as predicted in the model) water within coalitions, considering the different 
production (response) functions of each farmer. 
 
The CGT model makes the assumption of rationality of the players, which are profit 
takers. By comparing the results of the test session with the "theoretical" results 
obtained through the model (see tables in annexes B10 and B11), it can be observed 
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that in both versions of the experiment, unlike in the theoretical model, the result was 
not super-additive23, but for different reasons. 
3.2.2.2. Non super-additivity analysis 
In the first version, the dam manager’s criteria for the water allocation were unknown 
by the players, which made their decisions under uncertainty. The players asked for 
water even when playing as singletons. They were either optimistic on the probability 
of receiving water, despite the indications contained in the instructions, or, if they 
believed in the instructions, they did not expect the other players to ask for the full 
amount of water, or they went for a free riding of the reserve. Actually, only one 
player (farmer 3) out of three asked for the maximum amount of water. As a 
consequence, the domestic and ecological reserve was always preserved, except when 
the coalition by the farmers 1 and 2 played. In the partial coalitions phase, the farmers 
increased progressively their water (and surface) demand from less than expected in 
the theoretical model (63 700 m3) to all the water available (250 000 m3). This result 
could be due to a learning effect appearing through the replication of the same 
situation (Loewenstein, 1999; Eber and Willinger, 2005). 
 
Because, unlike what the theoretical model predicted (cf. annex B10), singletons and 
partial coalitions attempted anyway to ask for water, and the dam manager allocated 
what they asked for, it happened that v(1)+v(2)>v(1,2), v(1)+v(3)>v(1,3) and      
v(2,3) + v(1) > v(1,2,3), making the game not super-additive. 
 
In the second version, if the total demand was higher than the 250 000 m3 available, 
the dam manager distributed the 250 000 m3 among the players proportionally to their 
request. Therefore, water allocation to each player depended also on what the other 
players required. The reserve was always preserved. 
 
Unlike the assumption of rationality of the model, most players did not ask the total 
amount of water they could, even if in this case they did not risk anything by asking 
the maximum. Therefore, due to the water allocation rule, those who asked more 
water in a phase or round got proportionally more than those players that played 
conservative (e.g. farmer 3 required more than farmers 1 and 2). For the same reason 
the partial coalition {1,3}, asking the maximum and being faced with a low request 
from farmer 2, was able to have a profit v(1,3) that summed to v(2) is higher than 
v(1,2,3). For this reason, the second version results were not super-additive. 
3.2.2.3. Payoff sharing 
During the second phase of the first version, players were asked, after they played the 
partial coalition round, how they would share the payoff obtained. This is not relevant 
information to compare with the theoretical results, but it represented complementary 
information. In the three cases, unlike the logical expectation of payoff sharing that 
follows the different productivity of the three farmers, the players chose an equal 
allocation between the two of them (50% each). 
                                                 
 
23
 Let N be a finite set of n players in a transferable utility game. Let S and T be subsets of N (S and T 
are coalitions). Let v be a real-valued function defined over all the subsets of N. In the present 
experiment, v is the payoff obtained. 
A transferable-utility game is super-additive if for all S, T included in N, with S  T=Ø 
v(S  T)  v(S) + v(T) 
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During the final debriefing after having conducted the two versions of the game, the 
experimenter asked why the participants chose such a sharing. Farmers 1 and 2 who 
had a worse response function than farmer 3 had an interest in the equal sharing. The 
question was to know why farmer 3 accepted such repartition. Farmer 3 did not 
answer. It seemed that the two players playing farmer 3 role did not remember why 
they chose the equal repartition. They might have considered the equal sharing as a 
fair choice without having assessed the different farmers’ contribution to the final 
profit. 
 
The experimenter only communicated the payoffs obtained in the second version. 
Once the players knew all the profits obtained in the three phases they were asked 
whether they wanted to be in the grand coalition and, if yes, to share the grand 
coalition payoff. The following table (table 9) presents the results obtained in the 
second version. 
 
Phases Coalitions Payoff values (ZAR) 
{1} 49 768 
{2} 72 909 Singletons 
{3} 218 421 
{1,2} 145 385 
{1,3} 177 913 Partial coalitions 
{2,3} 298 305 
Grand coalition {1,2,3} 384 163  
Table 10. First test session - second version results 
As the game was not super-additive, farmer 3 did not want to participate to the grand 
coalition whereas farmers 1 and 2 had interest to play in the grand coalition. After 
negotiation, farmers 1 and 2 convinced farmer 3 to join them in the grand coalition by 
leaving to farmer 3 the same payoff as the one obtained in the first phase (singleton). 
Then, farmers 1 and 2 shared the remaining profit equally between the two of them 
(table 10). 
 
 Coalitions Payoff values (ZAR) 
{1} 82 821 
{2} 82 821 Farmers 
{3} 218 421 
Total {1,2,3} 384 163 
Table 11. First test session – second version: grand coalition payoff sharing 
3.2.3. Lessons 
This first test session provided some lessons that represent a basis to develop a new 
version of the game. The second version was better perceived than the first one 
because it was more transparent in terms of instructions. Particularly the rules of 
water allocation were perfectly known by the players. The second version will 
therefore be the basis to build the new instructions. The new version (version 3) was 
tested in a second session test (mid July). 
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3.2.3.1. The new instructions 
The second session test was not conducted with students but rather with staff 
members of the University of Pretoria. The players discovered the instructions at the 
beginning of the session without knowing previously the experimental framework. 
Consequently, the instructions had to be more detailed. For instance, the scheme 
drawn on the black board during the first session test would be included in the 
instructions. More detailed instructions should not require oral explanations and this 
fact is crucial when homogeneity among sessions and reduction of external biases is 
sought. According to some authors, with a homogeneous set of information given to 
the participants, replications of the game could be conducted in different places and 
different times (Rege and Telle, 2004; Eber and Willinger, 2005). 
 
In the first session, the second phase (partial coalitions) instructions were given aloud 
at the beginning of each round, whereas the third singleton farmer was already in the 
next room. It would be preferable to give the instructions at the end of the first phase, 
before asking to farmer 3 to leave the laboratory. Consequently, all the players will 
have the same information at the same time. 
 
The decision sheet will be inspired by the following model (table 11). 
 
Water request from 
the dam 
Dam manager’s water 
allocation decision  
 
Reserved to the 
experimenter.  
Do not fill 
Additional 
cultivated area 
Profit obtained 
 
Reserved to the 
experimenter.  
Do not fill 
 
…………….. m3 
 
m
3
 
 
……………. Ha 
 
ZAR 
 
Table 12. The new decision sheet 
An example of how to fill the decision sheet was given either in the instructions or 
directly in the decision sheet.  
 
The Excel program would be the same as used during the first session test. The 
explanation of the program and some examples would be written in the instructions. 
 
The payoffs presentation at the end of the session can be formalized and made as 
much neutral as possible. The resuming table of all payoffs obtained along the three 
phases of the game can be drawn on the black board as in the first session or an Excel 
table can be video-projected. In order to reduce the bias among different experiments, 
all the instructions regarding the grand coalition payoff sharing can be written. 
According to this, the experimenter then read aloud the instructions and then, the 
players could begin to play/negotiate. 
3.2.3.2. The new water allocation rules 
To increase the probability of super-additivity in the experiment, and therefore to 
have a meaningful share of grand-coalition payoff, the following water allocation rule 
was adopted. 
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Each singleton or coalition will first require water from the dam. If the sum of all 
requirements is higher than 250 000 m3, then each singleton or coalition will receive a 
maximum of water share corresponding to 1/3 (singleton) or 2/3 (partial coalition) of 
the 250 000 m3 (24). Once received from the dam manager a confirmation of the water 
available from the dam, each player will decide how much surface to irrigate. 
3.3. Second Test Session - 18th of July 2007 
The second test session was conducted the 18th of July 2007 in a meeting room at the 
Department of Agricultural Economics of the University of Pretoria. The game played 
during this second test session simulated the same water management problem as in 
the first test session. The original situation25 and the structure of the game with three 
phases26 were maintained. However, some modifications were made following the 
lessons learned during the first test session. These modifications are illustrated in the 
following section. 
3.3.1. Differences between the two test sessions 
This second test session was not run with students as the previous one, but with three 
researchers of the Department of Agricultural Economics. The three players, who 
discovered the game framework only at the beginning of the session, were located at 
three equidistant places of the central table of the meeting room (cf. pictures in annex 
C9). Unlike in the first test session where each farmer was played by a group of two 
students, each participant of the second session played the role of one farmer. As in 
the first test session, the farmers had a laptop open on a simple Excel program 
prepared by the experimenter to help them making their decisions (cf. the Excel sheet 
in annex B5). 
 
The instructions were modified (cf. Annexes C1, C2 and C3) to provide more written 
information than the original instructions used during the first test session27. As 
suggested after the first test session, the scheme (cf. figure 1 page 39) and details 
about the Excel program and the decision sheet were provided directly in the 
instructions. 
 
However, the main difference with respect to the original instructions consisted in the 
new dam water allocation rules, that look now as stated in part 3.2.3.2. 
 
                                                 
 
24
 In the version 2 played during the first test it was: If the sum of all requirements is higher than 
250 000 m3, then each singleton or coalition will receive a share of the 250 000 m3 proportional to the 
weight of his/her requirement on the total requirements. It is interesting to note that if all players play 
“rationally”, the two sub-versions bring to the same result (e.g.: 1/3 of 250 000 m3 to each player when 
singletons and 2/3 to the partial coalitions). 
25
 Three farmers, each having an initial endowment of 20 Ha, have the possibility to extend their area 
where to cultivate cabbage up to a maximum of 40 Ha, and are connected to a dam (having a total 
capacity of 350 000 m3, of which 250 000 m3 are available for irrigation) by an individual channel. 
26 During the first phase, the three farmers play as singletons. During the second phase, two farmers 
play together in a partial coalition whilst the third farmer still plays alone. Finally, in the third phase, 
the three players play together in a grand coalition. 
27
 This choice was made in order to reduce the biases coming from oral presentations that are inevitably 
different session after session.  
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Some examples of water demand were provided to the players in the instructions to 
illustrate the application of the water allocation rules (cf. instructions in Annex C1). 
 
Like in the second version of the first test session, the farmers made their decision in 
two steps: 1) they first formulated their water request, and then the dam manager (still 
played by the experimenter) informed them about water allocation. 2) Only at this 
point the farmers decided about the additional area to cultivate. They still used a 
decision sheet to communicate with the experimenter. However, the decision sheets 
were modified following the model presented in the lessons learned from the first test 
session, and they were different in each phase of the game (cf. annexes C4, C5 and 
C6). 
 
During the first phase (singletons), the decision sheet was exactly the one suggested 
in the lessons of the first test session, with four cells corresponding to the two 
decision process steps28 (cf. annex C4). 
 
During the second phase (partial coalitions), water demands were formulated 
individually in the same decision sheet, meaning that each farmer within the coalition 
made his own water request. Actually, the sum of the individual demands is the 
criterion followed by the dam manager to decide how to allocate water among the 
farmers. Each farmer of the partial coalition indicated his water demand in the same 
decision sheet29 (cf. annex C5). Water allocation was calculated and communicated 
by the dam manager, and then the farmers shared between the two of them the total 
water allocated. They indicated in their decision sheet how much area each farmer 
wanted to cultivate and how much water was used to irrigate it30. The experimenter 
calculated the partial coalition payoff and communicated it to the farmers; farmers 
where finally asked to share the obtained payoff between the two of them. 
 
During the second phase, the farmer out of the partial coalition left the experimental 
room. Unlike in the first test session, the third farmer did not play “actively”, whereas 
his water demand was taken into account in the round played by the two others when 
requiring water from the dam. During this phase, the experimenters considered the 
third farmer always rational (selfish) and profit-taker and therefore requiring the 
maximum amount of water for one singleton. 
 
During the third phase (grand coalition), the three farmers formed the “Irrigation 
Board”. They became themselves responsible for the dam management. Therefore, 
the first decision process step (i.e. water demand) disappeared, meaning that, after 
negotiation, the farmers decided directly how much area each one would cultivate and 
how much water would be used to irrigate it. Consequently, the decision sheet was 
simplified (cf. annex C6). 
 
                                                 
 
28
 The two decision process steps are: (1) water demand; (2) additional area to cultivate. Each decision 
step was divided in two moments: (a) farmer demand or decision on one hand, and (b) dam manager 
response. Therefore, the decision sheet was divided in four cells. 
29
 Instead of one decision sheet per farmer in the first test session, only one decision sheet was 
distributed to the two farmers forming the partial coalition during the second test session. 
30
 During the first test session, the farmers in the partial coalition only had to communicate the area to 
cultivate without specifying how much water would irrigate it. 
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Among all the parameters of the game, there was only one modification between the 
two test sessions. In the second test session, the productivity of farmer 3 was higher 
than in the first test session31. 
 
A detailed description of the phases is provided in annex C7. Unlike the first test 
session, the second session was not video recorded. 
 
All the differences between the two test sessions are summarized in the following 
table (cf. table 12). 
                                                 
 
31
 This change was introduced to amplify the difference between the repartition of payoffs among 
players when they play singletons and the corresponding repartition of the grand coalition payoff 
according to Shapley.  
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Game features First test session (12/06/2007) 
Second test session 
(18/07/2007) 
Students Researchers 
A group of two students 
played the role of one 
farmer 
One researcher played the 
role of one farmer 
The players Players already knew the 
framework of the game 
before the session (oral 
presentation one week 
earlier) 
Players did not know 
previously the game 
framework  
Water allocation rules 
(Second version) 
if (water demands) > 
250 000 m3 
 proportional water 
allocation among players 
if (water demands) > 
250 000 m3  quota: 
allocation at the maximum 
of 1/3 for a singleton (2/3 
for partial coalitions) of 
250 000 m3 
Decision sheet 
The same decision sheet 
model was used for the 
three phases. 
One decision sheet per 
farmer at each phase 
Each phase was played 
with a specific decision 
sheet model 
Instructions 
 The instructions were 
more detailed, with more 
information about the 
Excel program and the 
decision sheet, and with 
water allocation examples 
The third player out of the 
partial coalition played 
separately in another room 
The third player left the 
experimental room but did 
not play “actively” 
Partial coalition The partial coalition 
payoff was shared only 
“informally” between the 
two farmers 
Partial coalitions were 
formally required to share 
their payoff  
Farmer 3 productivity 
When well irrigated, 
farmer 3 productivity was 
3 800 bags/Ha 
When well irrigated, 
farmer 3 productivity was 
5 295 bags/Ha 
Table 13. Differences between the first and the second test sessions 
3.3.2. Results 
3.3.2.1. General observations 
The second test session of the experiment lasted 159 minutes (2h39) (cf. details in 
annex C8). If compared with the duration of the two versions tested with students 
during the first test session (81 and 61 minutes for version 1 and version 2 
respectively), the second session was longer. A major reason for this is that more time 
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was left to the participants at the beginning of the experiment to read and understand 
the instructions and the rules of the game. 
 
Except the water allocation rules (cf. part 3.2.3.2) and a higher productivity for farmer 
3, the same CGT model as in the first session test (second version) backed the game.  
 
The observed players’ behaviour was very close to the rational one assumed in the 
model, and this determined a high correspondence between the results of the game 
and those of the model (cf. tables in annex C10). It can be observed that the game 
resulted super-additive and that Shapley values payoffs stay within the core (cf. part 
1.2.2.2). 
3.3.2.2. Water demand analysis 
Like in the second version of the first test session, the decision process was divided 
into two steps: Players first demand water from the dam and then they decide the area 
to cultivate. Then, there was no uncertainty behind farmer’s choice of areas and there 
was an incentive for the farmers to ask for the maximum.  
 
During the first phase (singletons), two players asked for the water needed to 
cultivate the 20 Ha representing the maximum possible area extension (i.e. 182 000 
m3) as expected by the theoretical model and one asked for 83 333 m3 (probably 
anticipating the response from the dam manager). The three farmers received 83 333 
m3 and chose correctly their cultivated area in order to maximize their singleton 
payoff32. 
 
During the second phase, the partial coalitions always required 250 000 m3, 
corresponding to the total available water from the dam. As a result of the repartition 
of the coalition demand between the two farmers, though, while coalition {1,2} got 
the expected 166 666 m3 corresponding to 2/3 of the available water, coalitions {1,3} 
and {2,3} got only 151 333 m3. The following table (table 13) summarizes the partial 
coalition water demands and the corresponding allocations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
32
 Only marginal approximation adjustments in the calculations of the irrigated areas were observed at 
this stage. 
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Partial coalition 
{1,2} 
Partial coalition 
{2,3} 
Partial coalition 
{1,3} 
 Water 
demand 
(m3) 
Water 
allocation 
(m3) 
Water 
demand 
(m3) 
Water 
allocation 
(m3) 
Water 
demand 
(m3) 
Water 
allocation 
(m3) 
Farmer 1 100 000 83 333 68 000 68 000   
Farmer 2 150 000 83 333   68 000 68 000 
Farmer 3   182 000 83 333 182 000 83 333 
Partial 
coalition 250 000 166 666 250 000 151 333 250 000 151 333 
Third 
farmer 182 000 83 333 182 000 83 333 182 000 83 333 
Partial 
coalition  
+ the third 
farmer  
432 000 250 000 432 000 234 666 432 000 234 666 
Table 14. Second test session - phase 2 (partial coalitions): experimental 
water demands and allocations 
Once the farmers received their water allocation from the dam, they chose properly 
the additional area to cultivate and the corresponding water for irrigation (cf. tables in 
annex C10). Apart from the capacity of the players to calculate properly, this could be 
an argument in favour of the Excel program and the graph provided in the annex of 
the instructions as good tools to help the players making their decisions on the area to 
cultivate. 
 
In the third phase (grand coalition), the players felt the responsibility of becoming 
managers of the dam (“we have a new role now”), and played accordingly. They used 
the whole water available (250 000 m3) but did not intake the reserve. They also were 
able to allocate the irrigation water in order to get the maximum productivity (20 Ha 
to farmer 3 and the remaining 7 Ha to either farmer 1 or 2). Marginal differences 
between the cultivated areas in the experiment and the theoretical ones were also 
observed at this stage. 
3.3.2.3. Payoffs sharing 
During the second phase (partial coalitions), players were asked specifically, after 
they played each round, how they would share the payoff obtained. This information 
is not taken into account in the comparison with the theoretical results, but it 
represents complementary information for both the experimenters and the farmers. By 
sharing concretely the payoff obtained at this stage, players learn how to share a 
payoff with another farmer before the final negotiation that will take place in the 
grand coalition.  
 
The first round involved farmers 1 and 2 who have exactly the same yield when they 
irrigate properly (9 100 m3/Ha) the cultivated area. As expected, the payoff obtained 
was equally shared between the two of them (cf. table 14). Then farmer 1 left the 
experimental room and farmer 3 played the second round with farmer 2. Farmer 3 
productivity is higher than farmers 1 and 2 ones. Consequently, farmer 3 contributes 
more in the payoff obtained by a better production function. Therefore, farmer 3 has 
an advantage on farmers 1 and 2 when sharing the partial coalition payoff. However, 
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at the end of the second round, the payoff obtained by the partial coalition {2,3} was 
equally shared between farmers 2 and 3 without taking into account the higher 
productivity of farmer 3 (cf. table 14). This might be due to the fact that farmer 2 
already shared the partial coalition payoff with farmer 1 during the first round. 
Consequently, farmer 2 had an advantage on farmer 3 because of the experience 
gained. 
 
During the third round, farmers 1 and 3 already shared once a payoff; consequently 
they had the same level of experience. The profit obtained was shared this time 
according to farmer 3 productivity. Farmer 3 probably learned from the second round, 
when playing the partial coalition with farmer 2, and now took advantage of his 
higher productivity when sharing the payoff obtained together with farmer 1 (cf. table 
14). 
 
The following table (table 14) summarizes the payoffs obtained during the second 
phase (partial coalitions) and the repartitions of the payoffs between the two farmers 
of the corresponding partial coalition. 
 
 
Partial coalition  
{1,2} 
Partial coalition  
{2,3} 
Partial Coalition  
{1,3} 
Payoff 
obtained 
(ZAR) 
159 094 612 794 612 794 
Farmer 1 Farmer 2 Farmer 2 Farmer 3 Farmer 1 Farmer 3 Repartition 
(ZAR) 79 547 79 547 306 397 306 397 500 000 112 794 
Table 15. Second test session - phase 2 (partial coalitions): payoffs sharing 
 
At the end of the third phase, the experimenter communicated the payoffs obtained 
during all the three phases. Once the farmers knew all the profits obtained in the three 
phases, it was asked them whether they wanted to be in the grand coalition and, if yes, 
to share among the three of them the grand coalition payoff. The following table (cf. 
table 15) presents all the results obtained during the session and the theoretical ones 
calculated by the CGT model. 
 
Phases Coalitions Experimental Payoff (ZAR) 
Theoretical Payoffs 
(ZAR) 
{1} 79 547 79 958 
{2} 79 547 79 958 Singletons 
{3} 444 599 446 899 
{1,2} 159 094 159 917 
{2,3} 612 794 642 037 Partial coalitions 
{1,3} 612 794 642 037 
Grand coalition {1,2,3} 741 921 743 210 
Table 16. Second test session: the three phases payoffs and theoretical 
predictions 
The notations used for the analysis of the results are the same as the ones used 
previously in this text (cf. part 1.2.2.2). 
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A transferable utility game is defined by giving a finite set N of n players and a real-valued function v 
defined over all the subsets of N. In the present experiment, N is a set of three players and v is the 
payoff obtained by the various groups of players in the different phases of the experiment.  
N is said to be the grand coalition. We shall refer to other coalitions S, different from N, as partial 
coalitions. 
 
In the game, the payoffs of the singletons are noted v(1), v(2), v(3), the payoffs of the partial coalitions 
are noted v(1,2), v(1,3), v(2,3) and the payoff of the grand coalition is noted v(1,2,3). 
 
We are interested in the way in which the players share v(N) between themselves. In the experiment, 
the three players share v(1,2,3) between the three of them The part of the grand coalition payoff 
received by farmer i is represented by xi such as:  xi = v(N). The vector whose coordinates are xi is 
said to be an allocation. 
 
We remind a couple of theoretical definitions (cf. part 1.2.2.2 and Parrachino et al., 2006a): 
- a game is super-additive if for all S, T included in N, with  S  T = Ø,   v(S U T)  v(S) + v(T) 
- The core of the game is the set of all vectors x such that: 
 for all i  S and for all S,      xi  v(S)             (rationality) 
  xi = v(N)                                                          (efficiency) 
 
The results of the second test session provided:  
 v(1) + v(2) = v(1,2);   v(2,3)  v(2) + v(3)   and   v(1,3)  v(1) + v(3); 
 v(1,2,3)  v(1) + v(2) + v(3);   v(1,2,3)  v(1,2) + v(3);   v(1,2,3)  v(1,3) + 
v(2)   and   v(1,2,3)  v(2,3) + v(1). 
The super-additivity conditions were therefore respected.  
 
In our theoretical CGT model, the coordinates of the Shapley value are such that       
1 + 3 < v(1,3); and 2 + 3 < v(2,3). Therefore the Shapley value does not belong to 
the core (cf. part 2.2 and tables in annex C10). 
 
In the game resulting from the experiment the Shapley value lies in the core (which 
therefore will be non empty). The reason for this resides in the way farmers required 
water during the second phase. A lower water allocation to the partial coalitions {1,3} 
and {2,3} resulted in a payoff lower than expected by the model (cf. table 15 and the 
tables in annex B10) and also lower than the corresponding Shapley allocations in the 
experiment.  
 
As the game was super-additive and all Shapley allocations were in the core, the three 
farmers had no reason to stay out of the grand coalition. The grand coalition payoff 
was therefore shared between the three farmers as presented in the following table (cf. 
table 16). The rate Vi of the payoff as a singleton for farmer i is given by v(i)/v(i) 
(cf. tables in annex C11 and table 16). The rate Xi of what farmer i receives from the 
repartition of v(1,2,3) is given by xi/v(1,2,3) and the repartition following Shapley’s 
predictions is given by the rate Shi (cf. tables in annex C11 and table 16). For each 
farmer i, Xi is closer to Vi than to Shi. 
 
 
Value 
(ZAR) 
Rate Xi 
(%) 
Rate Vi 
(%) Rate Shi (%) 
Farmer 1 x1=100 575  13,5 13,2 15 
Farmer 2 x2=100 346  13,5 13,2 15 
Farmer 3 x3=541 000  73 73,6 70 
Total v(1,2,3)=741 921  100 100 100 
Table 17. Second test session: the grand coalition payoff sharing 
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Players actually declared during the debriefing to have followed as reference for the 
redistribution of v(1,2,3) the relative distribution of payoffs when they played as 
singletons. 
 
The small difference in the allocation between player 1 and 2 is merely due to 
calculation issues. The benchmark for players 1 and 2 in order to stay in the grand 
coalition was represented by 100 000 Rand. They did not pay a lot of attention to the 
small amounts they received above this threshold. 
3.3.3. Lessons and perspectives 
As the players said at the end of the game, the instructions were really self-
explanatory. When the experimenter proposed the players to read the instructions 
aloud, the players answered that it was not necessary. According to them, the 
instructions were clear and they understood quickly the objective of the game. This 
could be due to either the quality of the instructions or the ability of the players, 
knowing that players were researchers in Economics.  
 
The transition between the first phase (singletons) and the second phase (partial 
coalitions), as well as the transition between the second phase and the third one (grand 
coalition) must be prepared previously and more accurately. When distributing new 
instructions between two phases, the experimenter must introduce orally the new 
situation indicating for instance that from that moment onwards all previous decisions 
do not count anymore and that the new phase is like a “new year” where everything 
starts again from scratch.  
 
The water allocation to farmers in partial coalitions follows the rule of 1/3 max of 
available water to each farmer. This resulted in the allocation of 68 000 m3 of water to 
those farmers requesting this amount (lower than 1/3) even if the total amount of 
water requested by the coalition was 250 000 m3. In the next version of the game it 
will be introduced the rule of 2/3 max for the coalition as a whole. An improved 
explanation of the possibility to share the water among allocation’s members is also 
required. 
 
It could be useful to compare the grand coalition payoff allocation Vi with other 
theoretical benchmarks other than the Shapley value, such as for example the 
Nucleolus or the τ-value (cf. Parrachino et al., 2006a). 
 
Another question about farmer 3 productivity remains. So far, the game was only 
played with farmer 3 more productive than farmers 1 and 2. A possible change could 
consist in having farmer 3’s productivity lower than farmers 1 and 2. Such version of 
the game was prepared to be tested during the second test session, but was not played 
because of the length of the first version. 
 
In order to provide an incentive for players to “play rational”, most experiments use 
economic incentives. Even if no payment was provided to players during these two 
test sessions, the research group is planning to introduce some form of economic 
incentive in the future sessions. An idea would be to define “performance indexes” for 
each player based on players’ payoffs differentials in various phases of the game. For 
instance, IPi = (P1i-P0i)/P1i would take the difference between the payoff player i 
obtains in the coalition he agrees to stay (P1i) and the initial endowment (P0i) and then 
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relate it to the first term. In the played session, this would bring the following IP for 
the three players:  
 0.453 for player 1; 
 0.453 for player 2; 
 0.434 for player 3.  
These indexes, always < 1, could be multiplied by 100 ZAR or 10 Euro in order to 
calculate the individual monetary reward for each player. 
 
As they are constructed, these indexes reduce to 0 the productivity differences among 
players. The problem is that, if players play rational as singletons, these indexes could 
push players to aim at the repartition of the grand coalition payoff following the 
distribution of the singletons’ rates (Vi of table 16) instead of the Shapley allocation 
(Shi of table 16), as this repartition would provide the same monetary reward to all 
players. 
 
Further discussion will take place to define the right method to calculate the possible 
economic incentives to players. 
 
Finally, to simplify calculations, rounded figures will substitute the current ones. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion and research 
perspectives 
This Master thesis is part of a research project that was inspired by a participatory 
work on water governance in the Kat River Basin (Eastern Cape, South Africa). 
During this participatory project, a Companion Modelling (ComMod) approach was 
implemented. Stakeholders played a role-playing game (RPG) articulated around 
water management in order to understand the complexity of the local system and to 
build up a catchment strategy within the local water users association. The ComMod 
approach exhibited some regularity in the stakeholders’ behaviour that seemed worth 
further investigation. The outcomes of the RPG conducted with local stakeholders in 
the field were first compared with theoretical results predicted by a Cooperative Game 
Theory (CGT) model calibrated on the same data. Some similarities in the grand 
coalition payoff sharing appeared and suggested to deepen this comparison through an 
experimental use of a simplified version of the RPG to test a certain number of 
hypotheses made by the CGT. The EE approach was chosen because, unlike the 
ComMod approach used in the Kat, it provides the possibility to reproduce many 
times the same experiment in order to gather data and capitalize knowledge. However, 
EE commonly develops experimental protocols which are decontextualized. 
Consequently, the overall question treated by this research project is whether a 
contextualized experiment is useful to test theoretical hypotheses, and particularly 
how to simplify or adapt the real context to run valid experiments. 
 
A CGT model derived from the original RPG played in the Kat River was designed 
by S. Farolfi and F. Patrone and was the basis to build a contextualized experiment 
articulated around a water management issue. The results obtained through a repeated 
use of the contextualized experiment will be compared with those of the CGT model 
and then with a decontextualized version of the same experiment. 
 
The comparison of the results obtained is likely to provide insights on the 
correspondence between hypothetical and real behaviour of players when facing a 
situation of common pool resource (water) allocation in different conditions of 
cooperation. Experiments will be conducted with “candid players” such as university 
students first, and then with real stakeholders (water users, farmers, public decision-
makers), to observe the effect of experience on the behaviour of players. Experiments 
will finally be conducted modifying certain parameters, particularly those sensitive to 
policy tools, to observe how the adoption of specific water policies could influence 
local stakeholders’ behaviour. 
 
During the 4 months of stage at University of Pretoria, this Master focused more 
particularly on the preparatory work of this research project with the objective of 
designing and testing a contextualized experimental protocol. After the design phase, 
two test sessions were conducted, the first with students (12th of June 2007) and the 
second with researchers (18th of July 2007). These sessions provided some very 
important lessons to improve the protocol.  
 
However, the experimental protocol is not completely definite. Some context aspects 
remain to be discussed. Particularly, in the present game, water is required for free 
from the dam. We chose this game characteristic to simplify the experiment, but this 
characteristic (i.e. water provided for free) does not exist in any real context. Another 
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change to proceed is about the decision sheet used during the second phase (partial 
coalitions). It will be modified to take into account the “anticipation” of the water 
allocation between the members of the coalition, as observed during the second test 
session (cf. part 3.3.2.2). 
 
Some marginal changes will also be needed to improve the protocol before it can be 
adopted in an experimental context. Firstly, the duration of each phase of the game 
must be specified in order to limit the total length of an experimental session. 
Secondly, we will round the parameters of the game to simplify calculations. Thirdly, 
monetary incentives could be introduced to motivate the players. 
 
Once the experimental protocol is set-up in a satisfactory way, experiments will be 
conducted with candid players and experts. Two aspects of the experimental context, 
namely the decontextualized version of the game and the use of the game with candid 
and expert players were discussed within the research group. Some perspectives 
related to these aspects are summarized here below. 
4.1. The decontextualized experiment 
To get insights about the capacity of a contextualized game (CE) to test theoretical 
hypotheses, the results obtained through this CE must be compared with the results 
obtained through a decontextualized one as suggested by most authors in EE, 
following the between-subjects procedure (Wang, 1996a). 
 
The decontextualized experiment (DE) could be built in three phases as the CE - 1) 
singletons; 2) partial coalitions; 3) grand coalition - but with abstract terms instead of 
water management specific terms. For instance, the dam could be designed as a 
“common-pool”, water could become “tokens” and the farmers could be generic 
“players”. However, there is another way to decontextualize the game by providing 
directly to the participants of the DE all the payoffs obtained during the three phases 
of a CE (previously played by other subjects). The participants of the DE must share 
the grand coalition payoff without knowing on what all the information they get is 
based. Particularly, they do not know that the payoffs were obtained by playing a 
game articulated around a water management issue. They also do not have the same 
level of experience on payoff sharing as the players of the CE, who learned by sharing 
the partial coalitions payoffs. The experiment is then decontextualized by involving 
players only in the last step of the game, without presenting them all the three 
contextualized phases of the CE. The DE protocol remains to be built in the following 
stage of the research project. 
4.2. The players 
After having played both CE and DE with “candid players” represented by university 
students, a further step of the research consists in playing with “real” stakeholders 
involved in water management (farmers, water managers, decision makers). The 
objective of opening the experimental research toward the field aims at isolating the 
“experience” complexity component that influences players’ behaviour. Moreover, 
the external validity issue will be resolved by involving stakeholders in the 
experiment (Harrison and List, 2004). 
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A further development of this research project could be also to evaluate the impact of 
cultural background on agents’ behaviour by conducting the CE and DE with both 
students and stakeholders in South Africa and in France. Other features of the real 
complexity, such as History or the importance of water issues in each society could be 
evaluated by comparing the experimental results obtained by South-African and 
French samples (Carpenter and Cardenas, 2004). The translation of the experimental 
protocol should be made with many care, particularly to provide exactly the same 
information to all the players in both countries. 
 
Consequently, the research project could be viewed as a 2*2*2 experiment (2 
countries * 2 categories of players * 2 experimental contexts) and could provide 8 sets 
of data to compare.  
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Annex A 
The version V1 of the CGT Model 
 
Three farmers (i = 1,2,3) produce irrigated cabbages. Each farmer has a cultivated 
area of 20 Ha (S0i). The annual amount of water/Ha to reach an optimum yield (Yi) 
corresponds to (Wm) and it is the same for all farmers. Lower watering/Ha induces a 
reduction of Yi following the response functions indicated in the following table. 
Wm* S0i = W0i is available to all farmers from rainfall plus water reservoirs present in 
each farm. 
 
Production costs/Ha (C) are the same for all farmers and are independent of Yi. 
Farmer’s i profit/Ha (Πi) is calculated as: Πi=Yi*P-Ci. 
 
Values for Y, P, C, Wm are provided in the following table. 
 
 Y 
(Bags/Ha) 
Wm 
(m3/Ha) 
P 
(ZAR) 
C 
(ZAR/Ha) 
Response 
functions 
Farmer 1 3198 9100 6 16445 Y1=1200+0.2196*W1 
Farmer 2 3198 9100 6 16445 Y2=600+0.2855*W2 
Farmer 3 3800 9100 6 16445 Y3=1200+0.2857*W3 
Table 18. CGT Model – Version 1: Farmers’ parameters 
Each farmer can decide to extend his irrigated cabbage area, which becomes S1i. A 
maximum additional area of 20 Ha/farmer can be allocated. This would bring the max 
total area/farm (S1i max) to 40 Ha. 
 
A dam with a capacity of 350 000 m3 (D) can be used to irrigate increased surfaces 
cultivated at cabbage (S1i). W1i is the amount of water required by each farmer to 
irrigate S1i . 250 000 m3/year can be used for irrigation, whereas 100 000 m3 represent 
the Reserve (R). R must be allocated to human consumptions and ecological purposes. 
 
Each farmer will base his decision to increase his irrigated surface by S1i - S0i =∆Si, 
and therefore to increase Πi , on the possible additional amount of water available for 
him from the dam (W1i-W0i =∆Wi ). 
 
Farmers can require water from the dam either individually, or forming coalitions 
(partial or grand). Every singleton or coalition will consider themselves to be the last 
to have right to require water and will consider other players rational and willing to 
maximize their profit.  
 
In this first model, water from the dam has no cost. 
 
Side payments are allowed within coalitions. 
 
The problem can be formulated as follows: 
 
N = {1,2,3} 
 
D = 350 000  
R = 100 000 
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S0i = 20 
S1i max = 40 
 
Π0i= Πi∗ S0i 
 
Single Players: 
 
v(1) = Π01 
v(2) = Π02 
v(3) = Π03 
 
Remaining Water in the Dam: WD = 350 000 
 
Partial Coalitions: 
 
V(1) = Π01 
V(2,3) = Π02+Π03+X ; X(∆S 2,3, ∆W 2,3) 
with X being the profit obtained by cultivating additional area 
WD = 282 000 
 
 
V(2) = Π02 
V(1,3) = Π01+Π03+X ; X(∆S1,3, ∆W 1,3) 
 
WD = 282 000 
 
 
V(3) = Π03 
V(1,2) = Π01+Π02+X ; X(∆S1,2, ∆W1,2) 
 
WD = 282 000 
 
 
Grand Coalition: 
 
V(1,2,3) = Π01+Π02+Π03+Z ; Z(∆S1,2,3, ∆W1,2,3) 
with Z being the profit obtained by cultivating additional area 
WD = 100 000 
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Annex B 
First test session - 12th of June 
2007 
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Annex B1 
Instructions - phase 1: “singletons” 
 
NB: When it is not specified, the instructions were the same in both versions 1 and 2 of the 
game. 
 
FARMER 
 
You are a farmer producing irrigated cabbage (2 cycles per year). You are part of an 
irrigation scheme with other 2 farmers having the same area and producing cabbage 
like you. Your farm has an area of 20 Ha. The other farms have 20 Ha too. 
 
The water requirements for your cabbage are 9 100 m3/Ha. If you irrigate properly 
your cabbage, your annual yield/Ha corresponds to  
[farmer 1: 3 198 bags of cabbages (20 Kg each).] 
[farmer 2: 3 198 bags of cabbages (20 Kg each).] 
[farmer 3: 3 800 bags of cabbages (20 Kg each).] 
Market cabbage price, production costs and other technical information to allow you 
calculating your profit are available in the attached table. 
 
If you provide more water than 9 100 m3/Ha, your yield will not improve, whereas if 
you provide less than 9 100 m3/Ha, your yield will decrease following the response 
function that has been provided to you, whilst your costs will remain constant. 
 
This year very little rainfall is foreseen, but your storage facility allows you to collect 
efficiently this scarce water and to irrigate your initial 20 Ha. You and the other 
farmers can extend your area cultivated at cabbage up to a maximum of 20 additional 
Ha, for a total area of 40 Ha per farmer. But the only water available to irrigate your 
additional area comes from a dam that you share with the other 2 farmers.  
 
This dam contains 350 000m3 of water. 250 000m3 are available for irrigation whilst 
100 000m3 (the Reserve) must be allocated to human consumption and environmental 
uses. 
 
[Version 1: You can ask the dam manager for a water allocation, but you have no insurance to be 
satisfied. In fact you may well be the last (i.e. the 3rd) to be satisfied, as you are part of the irrigation 
scheme only since last year and do not know the criterions of the dam manager for water allocation.  If 
the other farmers want to maximize their profit, you can expect that they will ask for all the water 
available for irrigation from the dam (250 000 m3) to cultivate 27.5 additional Ha between the two of 
them. In the case you are the last to be satisfied, this will leave you without available water from the 
dam besides the Reserve. If you get water from the dam, it is for free. 
 
Please, fill-up your decision sheet indicating: a) how many additional Ha of cabbage you intend to 
cultivate; and b) how much water you require from the dam. If you decide not to increase your area, 
just indicate 0 Ha and 0 m3.] 
 
[Version 2: You can ask the dam manager for a water allocation, but you have no insurance to be 
satisfied. Your request for water cannot exceed your real needs. If the sum of the water requests will be 
lower than 250 000 m3, then you will get the water you have requested. If the sum of the water requests 
is higher than 250 000, then you will get an amount of water lower than what you requested and 
corresponding to the proportion of your request on the total water demanded. If you get water from the 
dam, it is for free. 
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Please, fill-up your decision sheet indicating:  
a) How much water you require from the dam; 
After you know how much water you will get from the dam, please indicate: 
 b) How many additional Ha of cabbage you intend to cultivate;. If you decide not to increase your 
area, just indicate 0 Ha and 0 m3.] 
 
To facilitate your profit calculations, a simple Excel model is provided. Through it 
you can explore different scenarios regarding the areas to cultivate and the 
corresponding water required. 
 
Parameters for profit calculations for all farmers 
Water 
requirement 
for cabbage 
(m3/Ha) 
Market 
price for 
Cabbage 
(ZAR/bag) 
Production 
cost 
(ZAR/Ha) 
9 100 6 16 445 
 
Cabbage yield response to water for the three farmers 
 
 
NB: 
* 1=farmer 1; 2=farmer 2; 3=farmer 3.  
* Farmers are heterogeneous: they have different response functions to water = different productivity 
of their land. 
* Some production is possible with no additional water (1200 bags/Ha for 1 and 3; 600 bags/Ha for 2). 
Bags/ha 
3 198 
1 200 
0 9 100 
600 
3 800 
1 
2 
3 
m3/ha 
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Annex B2 
Instructions - phase 2: “partial coalitions” 
 
NB: When it is not specified, the instructions were the same in both versions 1 and 2 of the 
game. 
 
INFORMAL DECISION GROUP 
 
You have now the possibility to define a strategy to cultivate cabbage using water 
from the dam with one of your colleague farmers (informal decision group). You can 
decide together how much water to ask from the dam and then how many Ha to 
irrigate as a group. 
You can choose to irrigate your own area, your colleague’s one or both. The 
coalition’s profit will be shared between you and your colleague using an agreed 
allocation scheme at the end of the season. 
 
[Version 1 
Your group will be allowed requiring water from the dam, but again with no insurance of being 
satisfied by first. In fact your coalition may well be second on the list of priority as you and your 
colleague are new in the irrigation scheme and do not know the criteria of the dam manager for water 
allocation. 
If the remaining (3rd) farmer wants to maximize his profit, you can expect him to require the full 
amount of water needed to irrigate his 20 Ha of maximum additional surface (182 000 m3). If your 
group is second to be satisfied, this will leave you with 68 000 m3 available from the dam besides the 
Reserve.  
 
After having discussed your common strategy within your group, please fill-up your decision sheet 
indicating: a) how many additional Ha of cabbage you intend to cultivate; and b) how much water 
you require from the dam. If you decide not to increase your area, just indicate 0 Ha and 0 m3.  
 
After having received your results, please indicate how you would share between you and your 
colleague your group’s profit.] 
 
[Version 2 
Your group will be allowed requiring water from the dam, but again with no insurance of being 
completely satisfied. If the sum of the water requests will be lower than 250 000 m3, then your group 
will get the water you have requested. If the sum of the water requests is higher than 250 000, then you 
will get an amount of water lower than what you requested and corresponding to the proportion of your 
request on the total water demanded. 
 
After having discussed your common strategy within your group, please fill-up your decision sheet 
indicating:  
 
a) how much water you require from the dam; 
 
After you know how much water you will get from the dam, please indicate:  
 
 b) how many additional Ha of cabbage you intend to cultivate; If you decide not to increase your 
area, just indicate 0 Ha and 0 m3. 
 
After having received your results, please indicate how you would share between you and your 
colleague your group’s profit.] 
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Annex B3 
Instructions - phase 3: “grand coalition” 
 
NB: When it is not specified, the instructions were the same in both versions 1 and 2 of the 
game. 
 
IRRIGATION BOARD 
 
You can now define a strategy to cultivate cabbage using water from the dam together 
with the other two farmers in the irrigation scheme (irrigation board). You can 
therefore use all the 250 000 m3 to irrigate your extended cultivated area or your 
colleagues’ ones. The coalitions’ profit will be shared between you and your 
colleagues using an agreed allocation scheme at the end of the season. 
 
[Version 1: 
After having discussed your common strategy with your colleagues, please fill-up your decision sheet 
indicating: a) how many additional Ha you intend to cultivate at cabbage; and b) how much water 
you require from the dam. If you decide not to increase your area, just indicate 0 Ha and 0 m3.] 
 
[Version 2: 
After having discussed your common strategy with your colleagues, please fill-up your decision sheet 
indicating:  
 
a) how much water you require from the dam; 
 
After you know how much water you will get from the dam, please indicate:  
 
 b) how many additional Ha of cabbage you intend to cultivate; If you decide not to increase your 
area, just indicate 0 Ha and 0 m3.] 
 
* * *  
 
 
After the results of all game phases are provided to all players:  
 
Now please share the commonly obtained profit among the three members of the 
Irrigation Board. 
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Annex B4 
The decision sheet 
 
 
 
 
Session…………..      Phase…………. 
 
 
 
Farmer n. …………… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
……………………………. 
Water Requirements (m3) Additional Area to Cultivate (Ha) 
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Annex B5 
The Excel program for each farmer 
 
 
farmer 1
Initial area (Ha) Additional area (Ha) 0
20 Additional water (m3) 0
Total water (m3) Irrigation water/Ha
182000 9100
Total area (Ha) Total cabbage production (bags)
3198,0001 63960
3198 Total profit (Zar)
54860
 
Table 19. Excel sheet for farmer 1 
 
 
 
farmer 2
Initial area (Ha) Additional area (Ha) 0
20 Additional water (m3) 0
Total water (m3) Irrigation water/Ha
182000 9100
Total area (Ha) Total cabbage production (bags)
3197,99995 63960
3197,99995 Total profit (Zar)
54860
 
Table 20. Excel sheet for farmer 2 
 
 
 
farmer 3
Initial area (Ha) Additional area (Ha) 0
20 Additional water (m3) 0
Total water (m3) Irrigation water/Ha
182000 9100
Total area (Ha) Total cabbage production (bags)
3799,999857 76000
3799,999857 Total profit (Zar)
127100
 
Table 21. Excel sheet for farmer 3 
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 Annex B6 
Description of the game’s phases 
 
 
First version: priority in water allocation unknown 
 
Total first version of the game duration = 1h21. The step duration details are given in 
the table in annex B7. 
 
In the first version context, the farmers did not know the criterions of the dam 
manager for water allocation (see instructions in annexes B1, B2 and B3). 
 
Introduction 
A first oral presentation of the experiment was provided to the participants. The 
instructions were read aloud. Sometimes, some examples or precisions were given 
whereas they were not written in the instructions. 
 
Phase 1: Singletons 
After the introduction, the experimenter gave time to allow the players to read 
individually the instructions. The experimenter had individual talks with each farmer 
in order to be sure that the players understood the instructions and to explain how the 
Excel program works. An individual tutoring was given in case of misunderstanding.  
After the individual explanations, the experimenter gave time to make the decision. 
The decision sheets were collected. 
 
The data were treated by the experimenter who took note of the results in a table (see 
annex B9). Each farmer’s payoff (profit) was individually communicated. 
 
After the first individual phase, two players were asked to stay in the experimental 
classroom while the third farmer was accompanied by the experimenter assistant to a 
next room with a laptop. 
 
Phase 2: Partial coalitions 
For the first round, farmer 3 in the next room still played individually, like in the first 
singleton phase; the instructions did not change for him. In the experimental 
classroom, new instructions were distributed to farmer 1 and farmer 2 who played 
together in a partial coalition. The instructions were read aloud. Then, the 
experimenter left time the players to make their decision. The decision-making 
procedure of the group was video-recorded. 
Farmers 1 and 2 did not give a common decision sheet. They did not have the same 
production function, so they chose the area cultivated by each one and the amount of 
water required to be shared between the two of them. Therefore, two decision sheets 
were collected for the partial coalition. 
The three decision sheets were collected. Farmer 3 came back to the laboratory while 
the experimenter treated the data. The payoff obtained by the partial coalition was 
communicated to farmers 1 and 2. It was asked how they would share the profit 
obtained. 
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For the second round, farmer 2 left the experimental classroom. Farmers 1 and 3 
formed the partial coalition. Farmer 3 did not know the new instructions for the 
“informal group” (partial coalition); therefore they were read aloud one more time. 
The same procedure was conducted as in the first round. The three decision sheets 
were collected. Farmer 2 came back to the experimental room while the experimenter 
treated the data. The profit obtained by the informal group was communicated to 
Farmer 1 and Farmer 3. It was asked how they would share the profit obtained. 
 
For the third round, farmer 1 left the experimental classroom and then farmers 2 and 3 
formed the partial coalition. All the farmers had already known the instructions. 
Therefore the experimenter did not read the instructions aloud. 
The same procedure was still conducted. The three decision sheets were collected. 
Farmer 1 came back to the experimental room while the experimenter treated the data. 
The profit obtained by the partial coalition was communicated to farmers 2 and 3. It 
was asked how they would share the profit obtained. 
 
After the three partial coalition rounds, the third phase began. The three farmers 
joined around a laptop in the experimental classroom. The three farmers played 
together and managed themselves the water from the dam. They formed an “irrigation 
board” and played what the CGT name as the “grand coalition”. 
 
Phase 3: Grand coalition 
The new instructions were read individually before the experimenter read them aloud. 
The farmers still decided the area cultivated by each one and the amount of water 
required from the dam for the irrigation. The farmers did not have the same 
production function, so the farmers had to decide the area cultivated by each one and 
the corresponding water to require from the dam. 
The three decision sheets were collected. 
 
Second version: proportional water allocation 
 
Total second version of the game duration = 1h01. 
 
In the second version context, the dam manager’s allocation rules are known by the 
farmers (see instructions in annexes B1, B2 and B3) 
 
This second version was not video-recorded. 
 
Introduction 
The instructions were read aloud, focusing particularly on the change made from the 
first version. The new mechanism of water allocation and the split of the farmers’ 
decision-making process in two moments were highlighted. 
 
Phase 1: Singletons 
After the introduction, the experimenter left time the players to make individually the 
decisions. Firstly, the farmers required the amount of water to the dam manager. The 
decision sheets containing the water requests were collected. 
 
The experimenter treated the water demands and communicated individually to each 
singleton the amount of water allocated. Then, the farmers knew how much water 
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they could use to irrigate their additional area. They chose the area to cultivate. The 
decision sheets containing the choices on cultivated area were collected. 
 
The experimenter calculated the payoffs (profits) for each farmer and communicated 
the results individually. 
 
After the first individual phase, two players were asked to stay in the experimental 
classroom while the third farmer was accompanied by the experimenter assistant to a 
next room with a laptop. 
 
Phase 2: Partial coalitions 
As the players already knew the principle of the second phase and the new water 
allocation system, the instructions were not read aloud  
 
For the first round, farmer 3 went to the next room, whereas farmers 1 and 2 stayed in 
the experimental classroom. Firstly, farmers 1 and 2 together chose the amount of 
water required to be shared between the two of them. Farmer 3 chose also the amount 
of water but individually. The decision sheets were collected. 
 
The experimenter treated the water demands and communicated the amount of water 
allocated to the partial coalition and to the farmer 3. Then, the farmers knew how 
much water they could use to irrigate their additional area. They chose the area to 
cultivate. Farmers 1 and 2 do not have the same production function, so they chose 
the additional area cultivated by each one. The three decision sheets were collected. 
 
The experimenter calculated the payoff for each farmer, while farmer 3 came back to 
the experimental classroom. Farmer 2 went to the next room with the experimenter 
assistant. 
 
For the second round, farmers 1 and 3 played together within the partial coalition 
while farmer 2 played individually. The same decision-making process was 
conducted. The experimenter treated the water demands and then the farmers chose 
the area to cultivate. 
 
For the third round, farmers 2 and 3 played together within the partial coalition while 
farmer 1 played individually. The same decision-making process as in the first and 
second rounds was conducted. 
 
For the last phase, the farmers formed the irrigation board (grand coalition). The three 
farmers joined around a laptop. 
 
Phase 3: Grand coalition 
The new instructions were not read aloud. Farmers 1, 2 and 3 played together within 
the grand coalition and chose the amount of water required to be shared between the 
three of them. The decision sheets were collected. The experimenter treated the water 
demands and communicated the amount of water allocated to grand coalition. Then, 
the farmers knew how many water they could use to irrigate their additional area. The 
three farmers decided the additional area cultivated by each one. The decision sheets 
were collected 
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The experimenter treated the data and gather the whole results obtained through the 
second version of the experiment. 
 
The payoffs obtained by the farmers individually in the first singleton phase and those 
obtained by the partial coalitions were presented before giving the payoff obtained by 
the grand coalition. 
 
After the presentation of all the payoffs, the experimenter asked the players what 
situation they preferred between playing alone (singleton), playing in the informal 
group (partial coalition) or playing all together (grand coalition). Each farmer 
answered. 
 
Then, the experimenter asked them to share the payoff obtained through the grand 
coalition. The players negotiated during 5 minutes and gave the experimenter their 
grand coalition payoff sharing among the three of them. Decision sheets were not 
used at this stage. 
 
At the end of the second version, the experimenter leads a debriefing on what 
happened during the two versions of the experiment. Some comments about the 
results were given and the players could detail the reasons of the different choices 
made along the experiment. 
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Annex B7 
Detail of the durations  
 
 
 Version 1 Version 2 
Phase Round  Time (minutes) 
 Time 
(minutes) 
Introduction  14 Introduction  6 
Decision Water  3 Tutoring 
+Decision 14 Treatment 
+Decision Area 4 
Treatment 2 Treatment 3 
Transition 2 Transition 2 
1 Singletons 
Phase 1 32 Phase 1 18 
Decision Water 4 
Treatment 
+Decision Area 4 1 
{1,2} 
& {3} 
Decision 
+Treatment 14 
Round treatment 1 
Decision Water 3 
Treatment 
+Decision Area 3 2 
{1,3} 
& {2} 
Decision 
+Treatment 13 
Round treatment 1 
Decision Water 2 
Treatment 
+Decision Area 4 3 
{2,3} 
& {1} 
Decision 
+Treatment 6 
Round treatment 1 
Transition 3 Transition 2 
2 Partial Coalitions 
 Phase 2 36 Phase 2 25 
Decision Water 
+Treatment 
+Decision Area 
4 Decision 
+Treatment 13 
Treatment 3 
Payoffs 
presentation  
0 Payoffs 
presentation  
6 
Negotiation 0 Negotiation 5 
3 Grand coalition 
Phase 3 13 Phase 3 18 
 Version 1 81 Version 2 61 
Table 22. First test session – Versions 1 and 2 – Detail of the durations 
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Annex B8 
The pictures 
(Version 1 & Version 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 1. First test session - Phase 1: “singletons” - Location of the players 
The three groups were located at the three corners of the experimental classroom. At the 
back of the classroom, the experimenter was tutoring farmer 3. 
 
 
 
 
Picture 2. First test-session - Phase 2: “partial coalition” - Partial coalition 
Round 3: farmers 2 and 3 played together within a partial coalition. 
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Picture 3. First test session - Phase 2: “partial coalition” - Third farmer 
Round 3: farmer 1 played individually in the next room 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 4. First test session - Phase 2: “partial coalition” - Treatment of the data 
After having collected the decision sheets, the experimenter treated the data. 
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Picture 5. First test session - Phase 3: “grand coalition” - Grand coalition 
The three farmers played together within the grand coalition 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 6. First test session - Phase 3: “grand coalition” - Presentation of all the 
payoffs 
The experimenter provided the participants all the payoffs obtained through the three 
phases of the game on the blackboard 
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 Annex B9 
Experimenter’s payoffs following-up table 
 
 
 
 
 
INDIVIDUAL PROFITS (IN ZAR/Year) 
Farmer 1  
Farmer 2  
Farmer 3  
INFORMAL DECISION GROUPS  
Farmer 1+ Farmer 2  
Farmer 1+ Farmer 3  
Farmer 2+ Farmer 3  
IRRIGATION BOARD  
Farmer 1+ Farmer 2 +Farmer 3  
Table 23. Experimenter’s payoffs following-up table 
 
 
 
NB: the table was the same for the versions 1 and 2 of the game 
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Annex B10 
Results and Theoretical predictions 
Version 1 
 
   Version 1       
Phase Farmers Water Request (m3) 
Additional 
area (Ha) 
Profit 
(ZAR) 
Super-
additivity 
Water 
request (3rd 
farmer) 
Remaining 
water in the 
Dam 
Shapley 
Value in 
Grand 
Coalition 
In the 
core 
1 {1} 45500 5.0 68575 No     60346 No 
Singletons {2} 45500 5.0 68575 Yes     70632 Yes 
  {3} 182000 20.0 254200 No   77000 253514 No 
2 {1,2} 63700 7.0 128921 Yes 0 286300 130978 Yes 
Partial  {1,3} 182000 20.0 309060 Yes 83333 84700 313860 Yes 
Coalitions {2,3} 250000 27.5 329632 No 63700 36300 324146 No 
3 Grand 
Coalition {1,2,3} 250000 27.5 384492     100000 384492 Yes 
          
   Theoretical case of the version 1    
Phase Farmers Water Request (m3) 
Additional 
area (Ha) 
Profit 
(ZAR) 
Super-
additivity 
Water 
request (3rd 
farmer) 
Remaining 
water in the 
Dam 
Shapley 
Value in 
Grand 
Coalition 
In the 
core 
1 {1} 0 0.0 54860 Yes     99560 Yes 
Singletons {2} 0 0.0 54860 Yes     99560 Yes 
  
{3} 0 0.0 127100 Yes   350000 185291 Yes 
2 {1,2} 68000 7.5 130210 Yes 0 282000 199119 Yes 
Partial  {1,3} 68000 7.5 229432 Yes 0 282000 284850 Yes 
Coalitions {2,3} 68000 7.5 229432 Yes 0 282000 284850 Yes 
3 Grand 
Coalition {1,2,3} 250000 27.5 384410     100000 384410 Yes 
Table 24. First test session – Version 1 – Experimental results and 
theoretical case 
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Annex B11 
Results and Theoretical predictions 
Version 2 
 
 
Version 2
Phase Farmers
Water 
Request 
(m3)
Additional 
area (Ha)
Profit 
(ZAR)
Super-
additivity
Water 
request 
(3rd 
farmer)
Remaining 
water in 
the Dam
Shapley 
Value in 
Grand 
Coalition
In the core
1 {1} 59295 9,0 49768 Yes 73437 Yes
Singletons {2} 59894 6,6 72909 Yes 76430 Yes
{3} 130809 14,4 218421 Yes 100000 234260 Yes
2 {1,2} 119190 13,0 145385 Yes 130810 100000 149903 Yes
Partial {1,3} 203443 22,4 315533 No 46557 100000 307733 No
Coalitions {2,3} 166666 18,3 298306 Yes 83333 100001 310690 Yes
3 Grand 
Coalition {1,2,3} 250000 27,5 384163 100000 384163 Yes
Theoretical case of the version 2
Phase Farmers
Water 
Request 
(m3)
Additional 
area (Ha)
Profit 
(ZAR)
Super-
additivity
Water 
request 
(3rd 
farmer)
Remaining 
water in 
the Dam
Shapley 
Value in 
Grand 
Coalition
In the core
1 {1} 83333 9,2 79958 Yes 87524 Yes
Singletons {2} 83333 9,2 79958 Yes 87524 Yes
{3} 83333 9,2 185258 Yes 100000 209362 Yes
2 {1,2} 166666 18,3 159944 Yes 83333 100000 175048 Yes
Partial {1,3} 166666 18,3 298320 Yes 83333 100000 296886 No
Coalitions {2,3} 166666 18,3 298320 Yes 83333 100000 296886 No
3 Grand 
Coalition {1,2,3} 250000 27,5 384410 100000 384410 Yes
 
Table 25. First test session – Version 2 – Experimental results and 
theoretical case 
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Annex C 
Second test session - 18th of 
July 2007 
Mathieu Désolé | Master Recherche EGDAAR | Montpellier SupAgro | 2007 
 
 
 
85 
 Annex C1 
Instructions - phase 1: “singletons” 
 
FARMER 
 
You are participating in an economic experiment. The instructions you are about to 
read are self-explanatory. The experiment is to proceed in silence. Talking is 
prohibited. Please raise your hand, if you have any question or if there is anything 
that is not clear to you. 
 
In this experiment, you are playing with two other people, meaning that your group 
consists of three members. You and the two other participants are farmers. You are 
part of an irrigation scheme with the two other farmers having the same area (20 Ha) 
and producing irrigated cabbage (2 cycles per year) like you. You will make a 
decision for only one cultivating season. 
 
You and the other farmers can extend your area cultivated at cabbage up to a 
maximum of 20 additional Ha, for a total area of 40 Ha per farmer. 
 
This year very little rainfall is foreseen, but your storage facility allows you to collect 
efficiently this scarce water and to irrigate your initial 20 Ha. The only water 
available to irrigate your additional area comes from a dam that you share with the 
other two farmers. If you cultivate your initial 20 Ha, you do not need water from the 
dam, if you conversely choose to cultivate more than 20 Ha, you must ask the dam 
manager for a water allocation to irrigate your additional area. 
 
The dam contains 350 000 m3 of water. 250 000 m3 are available for irrigation whilst 
100 000 m3 (the Reserve) must be allocated to human consumption and environmental 
uses. 
 
The figure below synthesizes the game context. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The water requirements for your cabbage are 9 100 m3/Ha. 
DAM 
250 000 m3 
100 000 m3 
20 Ha 
Farmer 1 Farmer 3 
Farmer 2 
20 Ha 
20 Ha 
Max =40 Ha 
Reserve 
Available for 
irrigation 
Max =40 Ha 
Max =40 Ha 
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− If you irrigate properly your cabbage, your annual yield/Ha corresponds to: 
[farmer 1: 3 198 bags of cabbages (20 Kg each).] 
[farmer 2: 3 198 bags of cabbages (20 Kg each).] 
[farmer 3: 5 295 bags of cabbages (20 Kg each).] 
− If you provide more water than 9 100 m3/Ha, your yield will not improve, whereas 
if you provide less than 9 100 m3/Ha, your yield will decrease following the 
response function that you find in the annex, whilst your costs will remain 
constant. 
 
Market cabbage price, production costs and other technical information to allow you 
calculating your profit are available in the attached table (cf. annex). If you get water 
from the dam, it is for free. 
 
You can ask the dam manager for a water allocation, but you have no insurance to be 
satisfied. You cannot require water in excess of your crops’ real needs. 
− If the sum of the water requests by all farmers will be lower than 250 000 m3, then 
you will get the water you have requested. 
− If the sum of the water requests by all farmers will be higher than 250 000 m3, 
then each farmer will get at the maximum 1/3 of the 250 000 m3 (i.e. 83 333 m3). 
 
The amount of water you will receive depends therefore on the choices that you and 
the other farmers make during the water allocation process.  
Examples of water allocation following the rules of the dam manager as described 
above: 
− If none of the three farmers requires water from the dam, the available 250 000 m3 for irrigation 
will stay in the dam. Each farmer will earn the profit obtained through cultivating the initial 20 Ha.  
− If none of the two other farmers requires additional water and you ask for the maximum amount of 
water you can require from the dam that is 9 100 m3/Ha * 20 Ha = 182 000 m3, the sum of water 
requests is equal to 182 000 m3, which is lower than the available 250 000 m3. You will then 
receive your expected amount of water equal to 182 000 m3.  
− If every farmer chooses to extend the cultivated cabbage area up to the maximum additional 20 Ha, 
each farmer will ask for 182 000 m3 from the dam. The sum of the water requests is then equal to 
546 000 m3, which is higher than the 250 000 m3 of water available for irrigation. Each farmer will 
then only get 1/3 of the 250 000 m3, equal to 83 333 m3. 
− If one farmer chooses to extend the cultivated cabbage area up to the maximum additional 20 Ha 
and consequently asks for 182 000 m3 from the dam, while the other two farmers ask for only 50 
000 m3 each, the total water requirements will reach 382 000 m3, which is higher than 250 000. In 
this case, the farmer that required 182 000 m3 will have only 1/3 of the available water = 83 333 
m3, while the two other farmers will have what they have requested = 50 000 m3 each. 
 
After having received by the dam manager an answer on the amount of water 
allocated to you, you will decide how many additional Ha you want to cultivate. 
 
To facilitate your profit calculations, a simple model constructed in Excel is provided. 
Through it you can explore different scenarios regarding the areas to cultivate and the 
corresponding water required. The Excel model is calibrated on the technical and 
financial parameters shown in the annex. 
 
The Excel program looks as follows: 
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Farmer 1
Initial area (Ha) Additional area (Ha) 0
20 Additional water (m3) 0
Total water (m3) Irrigation water/Ha
182000 9100
Total area (Ha) Total cabbage production (bags)
3198.0001 63960
3198 Total profit (Zar)
54860
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To get started with the Excel program, you can try to calculate the profit 
corresponding to the scenarios provided above in the examples. If you have any 
question, please raise your hand, an experimenter will attend you. 
 
You will receive a decision sheet like the one here below. Please, follow the 
instructions contained in the boxes to fill the white fields of the table. Grey fields are 
reserved to the experimenters. 
 
 
Water request from the 
dam 
 
Dam manager’s water 
allocation decision  
 
Reserved to the 
experimenter.  
Do not fill 
Additional 
cultivated area 
 
Profit calculated 
 
 
Reserved to the 
experimenter. 
 Do not fill 
…………….. m3 m3 ……………. Ha ZAR 
 
 
 
 
 
… and the  program 
calculates the 
corresponding profit. 
You may introduce any 
additional area and any 
water request… 
1) Indicate here how 
much water you require 
from the dam… 
…After you know how 
much water you will get 
from the dam… 
…2) Indicate here how many 
additional Ha of cabbage you 
want to cultivate  
 
  If you decide not to increase your cultivated area, just indicate 0 m3 and 0 Ha. 
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Annex 
 
 
Parameters for profit calculations for all farmers 
Water 
requirement 
for cabbage 
(m3/Ha) 
Market 
price for 
Cabbage 
(ZAR/bag) 
Production 
cost 
(ZAR/Ha) 
9 100 6 16 445 
 
 
 
Cabbage yield response to water for the three farmers 
 
 
 
NB: 
* 1=farmer 1; 2=farmer 2; 3=farmer 3.  
* Farmers are heterogeneous: they have different response functions to water = different productivity o 
* Some production is possible with no additional water (1200 bags/Ha for 1 and 3; 600 bags/Ha for 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NB: 
 
* 1=farmer 1; 2=farmer 2; 3=farmer 3.  
* Farmers are heterogeneous: they have different response functions to water = different productivity 
of their land. 
* Some production is possible with no additional water (1200 bags/Ha for 1 and 3; 600 bags/Ha for 2). 
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Annex C2 
Instructions - phase 2: “partial coalitions” 
 
INFORMAL DECISION GROUP 
 
The instructions you are about to read are self-explanatory and similar to those of the 
first phase, except that you have now the possibility to define a strategy to cultivate 
cabbage with one of your colleague farmers using water from the dam. You will then 
form an informal group of two farmers.  
 
You and your colleague can decide together how much water to ask from the dam and 
then how many Ha to irrigate as a group. You can choose to irrigate your own area, 
your colleague’s one or both, trying to achieve the best result collectively. 
 
Your group can require water from the dam, but again with no insurance of being 
completely satisfied. The following rules will apply. 
− If the sum of all water requests is lower than 250 000 m3, then your group will get 
the water you have requested. 
− If the sum of all water requests is higher than 250 000 m3, then each farmer will 
get at the maximum 1/3 of the 250 000 m3. Your group will receive therefore a 
maximum of 166 666 m3 of water. 
 
After having discussed your common strategy within your group, please fill-up your 
decision sheet indicating:  
 
Water request 
from the dam  
Dam manager’s 
water allocation 
decision  
 
Reserved to the 
experimenter. Do not fill 
Additional 
cultivated area 
Water to 
irrigate the 
additional 
area 
Profit obtained by 
the group 
 
Reserved to the 
experimenter. 
 Do not fill 
Farmer 
… 
…………… m3 m3 …………Ha …………m3 
Farmer 
… 
…………… m3 m3 …………Ha …………m3 
ZAR 
 
 
TOTAL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  If you decide not to increase your area, just indicate 0 m3 and 0 Ha. 
 
1) Indicate here how 
much water you require 
from the dam…. 
…After you know 
how much water your 
group will get from 
the dam… 
…2) indicate here 
how many additional 
Ha of cabbage you 
want to cultivate… 
… 3) and how many m3 
you will use to irrigate 
your additional Ha. 
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Annex C3 
Instructions - phase 3: “grand coalition” 
 
IRRIGATION BOARD 
 
 
The instructions you are about to read are self-explanatory and similar to those of the 
previous phase, except that you have now the possibility to define a strategy to 
cultivate cabbage together with the other two farmers in the irrigation scheme using 
water from the dam (irrigation board).  
 
You are now part of an Irrigation Board composed by all three farmers in the 
irrigation scheme. You are now responsible for the management of the dam, which 
has the same capacity and reserve as in the previous phases. You can use the water 
from the dam to irrigate your extended cultivated area or your colleagues’ ones, trying 
to achieve the best result collectively. 
 
After having discussed your common strategy within your group, please fill-up your 
decision sheet indicating:  
 
Additional 
cultivated area 
Water to irrigate 
the additional area 
Profit obtained by the 
group 
 
Reserved to the 
experimenter. 
 Do not fill 
Farmer 1 
 
…………..Ha ………….m3 
Farmer 2 
 
…………..Ha ………….m3 
Farmer 3 
 
…………..Ha ………….m3 
ZAR 
TOTAL  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 If you decide not to increase your area, just indicate 0 m3 and 0 Ha. 
 
1) indicate here how 
many additional Ha 
of cabbage you want 
to cultivate… 
… 2) and how many m3 
you will use to irrigate 
your additional Ha. 
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Annex C4 
Decision sheet - phase 1: “singletons” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Session……………..  Phase………. 
 
 
 
 
Farmer ………… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Water request from the 
dam 
 
Dam manager’s water 
allocation decision  
 
Reserved to the 
experimenter.  
Do not fill 
Additional 
cultivated area 
 
Profit calculated 
 
 
Reserved to the 
experimenter. 
 Do not fill 
…………….. m
3
 m
3
 ……………. Ha ZAR 
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Annex C5 
Decision sheet - phase 2: “partial coalitions” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Session……………..  Phase………. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Water request 
from the dam  
Dam manager’s 
water allocation 
decision  
 
Reserved to the 
experimenter. Do not fill 
Additional 
cultivated area 
Water to 
irrigate the 
additional 
area 
Profit obtained by 
the group 
 
Reserved to the 
experimenter. 
 Do not fill 
Farmer 
… 
…………… m3 m3 …………Ha …………m3 
Farmer 
… 
…………… m3 m3 …………Ha …………m3 
ZAR 
 
 
TOTAL 
 
Mathieu Désolé | Master Recherche EGDAAR | Montpellier SupAgro | 2007 
 
 
 
93 
Annex C6 
Decision sheet - phase 3: “grand coalition” 
 
 
 
 
 
Session……………..  Phase………. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Additional 
cultivated area 
Water to irrigate 
the additional area 
Profit obtained by the 
group 
 
Reserved to the 
experimenter. 
 Do not fill 
Farmer 1 …………..Ha ………….m3 
Farmer 2 …………..Ha ………….m3 
Farmer 3 …………..Ha ………….m3 
ZAR 
TOTAL  
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Annex C7 
Description of the game’s phases 
 
Total second test session duration = 2h39. The step duration details are given in the 
table in annex C8. 
 
Introduction 
The instructions and the decision sheets were provided to the participants. They did 
not know previously the game. Consequently a long time was left for an individual 
reading. The participants raised the hand when questions arose during the individual 
reading. The answers were given collectively to provide the same information to all 
the players. After 23 minutes, the experimenter asked them if they needed to read 
together aloud the instructions. The players answered that no, therefore the 
instructions were not read aloud and the first singletons’ decision process step (i.e. the 
water demand) began immediately after the individual reading. 
 
Phase 1: Singletons 
After the introduction, the experimenter left time the players to make individually the 
decisions. The players did not understand that the decision had to be made in two 
steps (i.e. the water demand firstly, and after receiving the water allocation from the 
dam manager, the area to cultivate secondly). Consequently, some players already 
were calculating the area to cultivate. The experimenter explained the decision 
process, and then the farmers only required the amount of water to the dam manager. 
The decision sheets containing the water requests were collected. 
 
The experimenter treated the water demands and communicated individually to each 
singleton the amount of water allocated. Then, the farmers knew how much water 
they could use to irrigate their additional area. They chose the area to cultivate. The 
decision sheets containing the choices on cultivated area were collected. 
 
The experimenter calculated the payoffs for each farmer and communicated the 
results individually. 
 
After the first individual phase, the experimenter explained the objectives of the 
second phase. At the same time, new instructions were distributed. 
 
Phase 2: Partial coalitions 
The new instructions were read individually by the three farmers. Once there were no 
more questions, farmer 3 left the experimental room for the first round. Farmers 1 and 
2 stayed in the experimental room. Farmer 3 did not play actively and stayed outside 
waiting for the end of the first round. 
 
Firstly, farmers 1 and 2 together chose the amount of water required to be shared 
between the two of them. The decision sheet was collected. The experimenter treated 
the water demands and communicated the amount of water allocated to the partial 
coalition. Then, the farmers knew how much water they could use to irrigate their 
additional area. 
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Secondly, they chose the area to cultivate. Farmers 1 and 2 do not have the same 
production function, so they chose the additional area cultivated by each one and the 
corresponding water for irrigation. The decision sheet was collected. 
 
The experimenter calculated the payoff for each farmer, and communicated it to the 
two farmers asking them how they would share it between the two of them. They 
communicated their payoff sharing and farmer 3 came back to the experimental room. 
Farmer 1 left the room and the second round was played with farmers 2 and 3 forming 
the partial coalition.  
 
The same decision-making process was conducted. The experimenter treated the 
water demands and then the farmers chose the area to cultivate and the corresponding 
water for irrigation. At the end of the round, farmers 2 and 3 shared the partial 
coalition payoff. 
 
For the third round, farmers 1 and 3 played together within the partial coalition while 
farmer 2 left the experimental room. The same decision-making process as in the first 
and second rounds was conducted. 
 
For the last phase, the farmers formed the irrigation board (grand coalition). New 
instructions were distributed with the grand coalition decision sheet. 
 
Phase 3: Grand coalition 
The experimenter explained the new objectives and the new instructions were read 
individually by the players. Farmers 1, 2 and 3 played together within the grand 
coalition and managed the dam. Consequently they chose the amount of water 
required to be shared between the three of them, without asking the dam manager for 
the water allocations. The decision sheet was collected. 
 
The experimenter treated the data and gather the whole results obtained through the 
experiment. 
 
The payoffs obtained by the farmers individually in the first singleton phase, those 
obtained by the partial coalitions and the payoff obtained by the grand coalition were 
presented by the experimenter in a video projected table. 
 
After the presentation of all the payoffs, the experimenter asked the players what 
situation they preferred between playing alone (singleton), playing in the informal 
group (partial coalition) or playing all together (grand coalition).  
 
The players negotiated during 17 minutes and gave the experimenter their grand 
coalition payoff sharing among the three of them. A decision sheet was not used at 
this stage and the grand coalition payoff repartition was communicated orally by the 
three farmers. 
 
At the end of the session, the experimenter leads a debriefing on what happened 
during the experiment. Some comments about the results were given and the players 
could detail the reasons of the different choices made along the experiment. 
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Detail of the durations 
 
Phase  Time (minutes) 
Distribution of instructions 
& decision sheets 
+individual reading  
23 
(collective reading) Possibly 
questions  1 
Water demand 8 
Treatment + 
Decision (Area +Water) 3 
1 Singletons 
Treatment 1 
 
 
Phase 1 36 
Round 
Distribution of instructions 
& decision sheets 
+individual reading 
9 
Water demand 7 
Treatment + 
Decision (Area +Water) 2 
Round treatment 1 
1 {1,2} & {3} 
Profit sharing 1 
  
Transition 1 
Water demand 7 
Treatment + 
Decision (Area +Water) 9 
Round treatment 1 
2 {2,3} & {1} 
Profit sharing 1 
  
Transition 2 
Water demand 2 
Treatment + 
Decision (Area +Water) 3 
Round treatment 1 
2 Partial    Coalitions 
3 {1,3} & {2} 
Profit sharing 6 
 
 
Phase 2 53 
Distribution of instructions 
& decision sheets 
+individual reading 
2 
Decision (Area +Water) 28 
Round treatment 2 
Payoffs presentation  4 
Negotiation 17 
Treatment 3 
3 Grand coalition 
Restitution (Debriefing) 14 
Phase 3 70 
159 
  
Total 
2h39 
Table 26. Second test session - Detail of the durations 
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The pictures 
 
 
Picture 7. Second test session - Phase 1: “singletons” - Location of the players 
The three farmers were located at three distant places of the central table of the room 
 
 
Picture 8. Second test session - Phase 2: “partial coalition” - Round 1 
Farmers 1 and 2 played together within a partial coalition. 
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Picture 9. Second test session - Phase 2: “partial coalition” - Round 2 
Farmers 2 and 3 played together within a partial coalition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 10. Second test session - Phase 3: “grand coalition” - Grand 
coalition 
The three farmers played together within the grand coalition. 
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Picture 11. Second test session - Phase 3: “grand coalition” - Presentation 
of all the payoffs 
All the payoffs obtained through the three phases of the game were video projected 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 12. Second test session - Phase 3: “grand coalition” - Projection of 
the payoffs 
The video-projection of all the payoffs obtained through the three phases of the game 
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Results and theoretical predictions 
 
 
 
Second test Session
Phase Farmers
Water 
Request 
(m3)
Additional 
area (Ha) Profit (ZAR)
Super-
additivity
Remaining 
water in the 
Dam
Shapley 
Value in 
Grand 
Coalition
In the core
1 {1} 83333 9,0 79547 Yes 110848 Yes
Singletons {2} 83333 9,0 79547 Yes 110848 Yes
{3} 83333 9,0 444599 Yes 100001 520224 Yes
2 {1,2} 166666 18,0 159094 Yes 100001 221697 Yes
Partial {1,3} 151333 17,0 612794 Yes 115334 631073 Yes
Coalitions {2,3} 151333 17,0 612794 Yes 115334 631073 Yes
3 Grand 
Coalition {1,2,3} 245700 27 741921 104300 741921 Yes
Theoretical case
Phase Farmers
Water 
Request 
(m3)
Additional 
area (Ha) Profit (ZAR)
Super-
additivity
Remaining 
water in the 
Dam
Shapley 
Value in 
Grand 
Coalition
In the core
1 {1} 83333 9,2 79958 Yes 106227 Yes
Singletons {2} 83333 9,2 79958 Yes 106227 Yes
{3} 83333 9,2 446899 Yes 100000 530757 Yes
2 {1,2} 166666 18,3 159917 Yes 100000 212453 Yes
Partial {1,3} 166666 18,3 642037 Yes 100000 636983 No
Coalitions {2,3} 166666 18,3 642037 Yes 100000 636983 No
3 Grand 
Coalition {1,2,3} 250000 27,47 743210 100000 743210 Yes
 
Table 27. Second test session - Experimental results and theoretical case 
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Shapley values and the three phases’ payoffs 
 
 
 
 
 
Coalition Value (Rate) V
Coalition Values ---------> v(1) 79547 0,132
v(2) 79547 v(1)+v(2)+v(3)= 603693 0,132
v(3) 444599 0,736
v(1,2) 159094
v(1,3) 612794
v(2,3) 612794
v(1,2,3) 741921
Marginal contribution of farmer j to the coalition
Permutation 1 2 3
123 79547 79547 582827
132 79547 129127 533247
213 79547 79547 582827
231 129127 79547 533247
312 168195 129127 444599
321 129127 168195 444599
Total 665090 665090 3121346
Shapley value      ----------> Shapley value 110848 110848 520224
percent of overall profit   ------> (Rate) Sh 0,15 0,15 0,70
 
Table 28. Second test session - Shapley values and the three phases’ payoffs 
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Mathieu Désolé 
 
Testing Cooperative Game Theory through a Contextualized Role-Playing 
Game about Irrigation Water Management 
 
Summary 
This Master thesis is the first step of a researh project and is based on the work of 
construction and test of an experimental protocol, adopting a simplified Role-Playing Game 
(RPG) to test hypotheses issued from Cooperative Game Theory (CGT). The RPG context 
refers to the case of common property water allocation among farmers and derives from 
observations made during a participatory project on water governance in the Kat River Basin 
(Eastern Cape, South Africa). The adoption of the simplified RPG for experiments triggers 
the following research question: can we use a contextualized Role-Playing Game in a 
laboratory to test theoretical hypotheses? To provide insights on the issue of game 
contextualization, some CGT hypotheses can be tested through both contextualized and de-
contextualized versions of the RPG. Two test sessions of the contextualized game (CE) 
protocol were run and provided lessons to improve it before it will be adopted in a real 
experimental context. The de-contextualized experiment (DE) protocol remains to be built in 
the following stage of the research project. 
 
Key-words 
Cooperative Game Theory; Experimental Economics; Protocol; Context; Water management; 
 
Test de la Théorie des Jeux Coopératifs à travers un Jeu de Rôles 
Contextualisé autour de la Gestion de l’Eau d’Irrigation 
  
Résumé 
Ce mémoire de Master est la première étape d’un projet de recherche et repose sur la 
construction et le test d’un protocole expérimental, basé sur un Jeu de Rôles (JDR) simplifié, 
pour tester des hypothèses dérivées de la Théorie des Jeux Coopératifs (TJC). Le contexte du 
JDR se réfère à l’allocation d’eau en propriété commune entre des agriculteurs, et dérive des 
observations faites pendant un projet participatif sur la gouvernance de l’eau mené dans le 
bassin versant de la rivière Kat (Eastern Cape, Afrique du Sud). L’adoption d’un JDR 
simplifié pour faire des expériences pose la question suivante : peut-on utiliser un JDR 
contextualisé pour tester des hypothèses théoriques ? Pour répondre au problème de la 
contextualisation du jeu, des hypothèses issues de la TJC peuvent être testées à la fois à 
travers une version contextualisée et une décontextualisée du JDR. Deux sessions ont été 
conduites pour tester la version contextualisée du protocole du JDR et ont permis son 
amélioration avant son adoption dans un vrai contexte expérimental. La version 
décontextualisée du JDR reste à construire dans les prochaines étapes du projet de recherche. 
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Théorie des Jeux Coopératifs; Economie Experimentale; Protocole; Contexte; Gestion de 
l’Eau 
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